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RELIGION, RATIONALITY, AND SPECIAL TREATMENT
Jane Rutherford*
Religion has always played a majorrole in American society, both politically
andsocially. Its influence on the Constitutionis expressedin the Establishmentand
Free Exercise Clauses. Why is religion given special treatment by the
Constitution? In this Article, Professor Jane Rutherford makes a structural
argumentforreligiousliberty. Rutherfordposits that religionis treateddifferently
not because of the content of its views, but because of the various otherfunctions
it serves, such as providingvoicesfor outsidersand advancingnon-market values.
Rutherford concludes that we should return to more serious enforcement of the
Establishment andFree Exercise Clauses in orderto give a more principledbasis
for preservingimportant liberties.

When I was small and my parents promised a "special" treat, I expected
something extraordinary. A special treat was more than an ice cream cone or a visit
to a local attraction. It was a trip out of town or a treasured gift. "Special" has an
entirely different meaning for my children. My daughter works for a special
recreation association in the summer. It doesn't mean that she takes the children on
extraordinary trips or provides treasured gifts. Instead, it means that the children
who attend her day camp have extra needs for attention. In this way, the word
"special" has been transformed from meaning unusually privileged to meaning
unusually disadvantaged. Both meanings are captured on the "church lady" skits
on Saturday Night Live reruns. When the church lady says, "Well, isn't that
special?," she is sarcastically implying that her guest is both privileged and
misguided.
These dual meanings of the word "special" have carried over into the debates
Professor, DePaul University College of Law. Many thanks are due the kind
individuals who read earlier drafts of this paper including Mary Becker, Timothy O'Neill,
Deborah Waire Post, and Mark Weber. I greatly appreciate the hard work of my research
assistants, Christopher Carmichael, Kevin Cook, Rachel Hempel, Hilary Kipnis, Raizel
Liebler, and Melissa Ramirez.
*
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about which groups are entitled to have special treatment. Thus, special treatment
sometimes is viewed with disfavor because it creates the impression of groups that
are both uniquely demanding and stigmatized. As a result, outsiders who complain
are characterized as whiners who want special favors rather than righteously
indignant citizens who seek justice. Familiar as these ideas are for the affirmative
action debates on race and gender, it is still slightly jarring to see them applied in
the context of religious freedom. Nevertheless, the crux of the current debate about
religious liberty centers on the issue of whether religion is special. Both the Free
Exercise Clause exemptions and the Establishment Clause limits seem to
presuppose that religion is special and distinguishable from other forms of
philosophy and speech. Some scholars have argued that religion is special because
it makes non-rational claims.' That position poses a number of problems for a legal
system that continues to view itself as deeply committed to rationality.
"Law... may ...be defined as 'Reason free from all passion."' 2 Although

Aristotle's definition may be open to question, law continues to be committed to
rationality and therefore, generally prefers rational behavior to nonrational,
emotional, 3 or superstitious behavior. Why then, does the First Amendment create
a preference for the supra-rational in the religion clauses? Arguably, one of the
reasons religion is protected is precisely because it is supra-rational: involving deep
emotional commitments not based solely on logic. Courts, however, carry their
preference for rationality into the interpretation of the religion clauses, and the
result has been to diminish religious liberty in general and to privilege those faiths
that appear more rational.
Any distinction between rationality and irrationality neither explains nor
supports religious liberty. Indeed, the distinction itself is open to serious question.
As leading scholars have suggested, it may be impossible to distinguish religion
from philosophy.' What then justifies treating religion as special under either the
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause? In this Article, I argue that
religion is special not because of the content of its views, but because of the role it
plays in balancing power, providing voices for outsiders, advancing non-market
values, and fostering individual identity and spirituality. Thus, I make a structural
argument for religious liberty. The structural justification for religious liberty
suggests a different set of limits on the scope of religious liberty as well.

See Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the ConstitutionalDefinitionofReligion, 22 CuMB.
L. REV. 1, 33 (1991); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal,23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 385 (1994).
2 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICSOF ARISTOTLE 146 (Ernest Baker trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1946).

' For example, the tax code excludes tort awards for physical injuries from taxable
income, but taxes the income from awards for emotional harm. I.R.C. § 104 (2000).
' See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 571 (1998).
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I. ISTHERE A PREFERENCE FOR RATIONALITY?
The commitment to reason is deeply imbedded in Western traditions. Aristotle
believed that it was this capacity to reason, or the "rational principle," that separated
humans from animals.' Thus, Locke argued that those individuals who can exercise
reason are entitled to liberty, while those with diminished reasoning capacity are
subject to the control of others.'
Although "rationality" is generally perceived positively, while irrationality is
considered a fault, the terms are not easy to define. Rationality could be defined
narrowly to mean formal logic, including the processes of deduction and induction,
like the process of proving a mathematical theorem. This f6rmal method of.
reasoning requires linear thinking in which one principle follows inevitably from
the previous one. This process is enshrined in Western philosophical history in the
work of Descartes and even Hobbes.7 Such narrow linear reasoning is likely to lead
to the conclusion that there is only one correct answer to any given question. Thus,
Descartes writes: "[T]here is only one truth in any matter, whoever discovers it
knows as much about it as can be known."8
A number of disturbing consequences flow from the quest for a single universal
truth. First, of course, it privileges one set of views and discards all other
perspectives. Contrary views are necessarily untruth or heresy. It is only a short
step from labeling an idea as heresy to persecuting individuals as heretics. Thus,
it is not surprising that the witchcraft trials emerge about a generation after
Descartes. As the witchcraft example demonstrates, finding a single truth often
descends into persecuting heretics who are outsiders. In the case of witchcraft,
those chosen for persecution often were women who upset the balance of power in
their communities, either by living independently or by claiming unusual strength.'
Hence, women who were healers or midwives were often the target of witchcraft

' ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 314; see also RENE DESCARTES, Discourse on the
Method, in DESCARTES PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 7 (Elizabeth Anscombe ed. & Peter
Thomas Geach trans., Thomas Nelson & Sons 1966) (1637) ("[R]eason or sense... is the
only thing that makes us men and distiguishes us from brutes.").
6 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 134-45 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, Two TREATISES].
See DESCARTES, supranote 5, at 20-23; THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 45-47 (Herbert
W. Schneider ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1958) (1651) (describing reasoning as a form of
addition and subtraction in which the reasoner begins with a few definitions and proceeds

from "one consequence to another").
8 DESCARTES, supranote 5, at 22.
" Rosemary Ruether argues that Puritan women, who had been persecuted dissidents in
England and who faced great burdens in the colonies, were unusually strong and

independent. These qualities clashed with the Puritan doctrine that strictly limited women's
roles. Ruether sees the trial of Anne Hutchinson, as well as the witch hunts, as methods "to
cow or to eliminate these 'improper' women and to reinforce the normative standard of
women's behavior and place in Puritan society." ROSEMARY R. RUETHER, SEXISM AND
GOD-TALK: TOWARD A FEMINIST THEOLOGY 171 (1983).
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prosecutions." Others were labeled as witches because they were social misfits,
marked in some way as unattractive. For example, women with visible warts or
moles were often called witches," as were women who had defective or stillborn
babies. 2 As the witchcraft example illustrates, a strictly linear search for the one
truth risks both discarding alternative views and creating a hierarchy of insiders and
outsiders.
Not surprisingly, modem and post-modern scholars are more skeptical about the
3
possibility of a single universal truth that can be discovered by linear reasoning.'
Modem liberal thinkers argue that there are many competing truths, but cling to the
idea that there is an objective and knowable world in which autonomous individuals
can make choices.'" Postmodern theorists reject absolute truth altogether in favor
of multiple interpretations that are open to debate." Nevertheless, some prominent
scholars continue to define the rule of law in terms of the search for truth, 6 and
however quixotic the quest, the Supreme Court continues to be committed to the

10

See ANNE L. BARSTOW, WITCHCRAZE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WITCH

HUNTS 19, 109-27 (1994); MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A
PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 64 (1973); ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING

139-40 (1974).
" See, e.g., Martha M. Young, Comment, The Salem Witch Trials 300 Years Later:
How FarHas the American Legal System Come? How Much FurtherDoes it Need to Go?,

64 TUL. L. REv. 235, 245-246 (1989) (describing how the Devil's mark, marks on the
accused's body, were used to identify witches in witch trials).

12 For example, Anne Hutchinson, Mary Dyer, and Jane Hawkins were all accused of
being witches partly because Hutchinson and Hawkins delivered Dyer's stillborn child. See
Rosemary S. Keller, New England Women: Ideology and Experience in First-Generation
Puritanism(1630-1650), in 2 WOMEN AND RELIGION INAMERICA 140 (Rosemary R. Ruether

& Rosemary S. Keller eds., 1983). Of course, the fact that Anne Hutchinson had emerged
as a powerful preacher of anti-nomianist views made her a heretic both for being a woman
who exceeded her role, and for challenging existing doctrine. See ROOT OF BITTERNESS:
DOCUMENTS OF THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 3-10 (Nancy F. Cott et al. eds.,

2d ed. 1996).
"3 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Liberalism,Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 763,792-97 (1993); Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Setting the Just
Bounds Between Church andState,97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255,2324-32 (1997); Stanley Fish,
Why We Can'tAll Just GetAlong, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 18-26 [hereinafter Fish, Get
Along]; Gedicks, supra note 4, at 571; Michael J. Sandel, PoliticalLiberalism, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 1765, 1776-94 (1994) (book review).

1' See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 95-117 (1997).
's See, e.g., JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND
POSTMODERNISM INTHE CONTEMPORARY WEST 199-202 (1990); Jfirgen Habermas, Reply
to Symposium Participants,Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477,

1502 (1996) (responding to Thomas McCarthy by rejecting the premise of "one right
answer"); Linda Singer, Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE
POLITICAL 466 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992) (describing postmodernism as
rejecting uniform rationalist views in favor of "communication networks").
16 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 14, at 95-117.
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search for rationality,' if for not absolutely provable truth. 7
Generally, rationality means that a proposition can be defended with reason and
arguments rather than mere coercion or physical force.' 8 In this sense, rationality
is the opposite of arbitrariness. Black's Law Dictionary defines "arbitrary" as
"capriciously or at pleasure. Without adequate determining principle.., depending
on the will alone; absolutely in power."' 9 This notion of reasoned judgment, as
opposed to arbitrary abuse of power, is at the core of the notion of the rule of law
and has roots that can be traced back to the Magna Carta. My favorite example
to illustrate the historical distinction between reasoned judgment and arbitrary
decisions2' is this 'unexplained entry in King John's ledger of fees from the
thirteenth century: "The wife of Hugh de Neville gives the lord King 200 chickens
that she may lie with her husband for one night."22 From a contemporary
perspective, this entry seems completely inexplicable. Greedy King John (the bad
guy in the Robin Hood story) seems to have hit upon a truly arbitrary and excessive
charge. Unfortunate individuals like Hugh's wife may only have paid such
outrageous claims because they feared the King's minions (like the Sheriff of
'7 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,765 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) ("the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process")
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 643 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Discharge of the particular plaintiffs
before us would be rational ... ."); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 854
(1996) ("[G]oodwill is recognized as valuable because a rational purchaser would not pay
more than assets are worth...."); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 741 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This is not a rational argument proving
religious favoritism.... .");NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778
(1990) ("We find the Board's no-presumption approach rational as an empirical matter.");
Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 350 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority's
efforts to imagine plausible legislative scenarios cannot obscure the simple truth... that
Congress had [no] rational basis for deciding ... surviving divorced spouses who remarried
could not receive the same survivor's benefits allowed to remarried widowed spouses.");
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 333 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the very
premise of Winship is that properly selected judges and properly instructed juries act
rationally, that the former will tell the truth when they declare that they are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ."); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he underlying aim ofjudicial inquiry is ascertainable truth,
everything rationally related to ascertaining the truth is presumptively admissible.").
" See I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 9-14 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984)
[hereinafter HABERMAS].
'9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 104 (6th ed. 1990).
2 See Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1992)
[hereinafter Rutherford, Myth].
21 Of course, the process of deciding whether a decision is arbitrary or principled is itself
subject to the risk of arbitrariness. Thus the quest for principled decision-making is infinite.
Like fractals, each decision is part of an infinite series of evaluations of rationality.
22 JAMES CLARKE HOLT, MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT 88 (1985)
(quoting ROTULI DE OBLATIS ET FINIBUS 275 (T. Duffus Hardy ed., 1835)).
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Nottingham). By definition then, arbitrary actions are backed by superior power
rather than persuasion.23 King John's decision to fine or tax Hugh's wife for
sleeping with her husband appears arbitrary not only because the king was
powerful, but also because it does not seem to follow from any fixed principle. Of
course, the king could respond that he was relying on a fixed principle: he had prior
sexual rights to his tenants under feudal law, and he intended to exercise those
rights unless paid. However, the prior sexual rights of a feudal lord are themselves
based on power rather than consent or persuasion. Thus, Hugh's wife might
respond that to avoid being arbitrary, the king's justification must rest on some
shared norms or values.24 Hence, some scholars like JUrgen Habermas argue that
although law cannot be reduced to morality, law is necessarily influenced by
morality.2" Thus, it is not sufficient merely to claim principles or reason in order
for a decision to be rational; it must also fit within a normative construct shared by
26
the relevant community.
Many philosophers, however, posit law as entirely divorced from morality,
which is inherently subjective.27 For scholars like Max Weber (positivists), law is
whatever courts and legislatures say it is.2" Law is rational to the extent that it is
adopted according to previously agreed upon methods, such as legislative
enactments or court decisions.29 Moral limits merely render law subject to open
ended debates about legitimacy. Hence, Weber argued that when law relies too
heavily on ethics, it becomes "substantively irrational."3 Thus, for Weber,
rationality is a matter of process rather than content.
Another common way to define rationality is in contrast to emotion. 3 Thus, we
23

For a discussion of the nature of law as precepts backed by government power to

enforce them, see MAX WEBER ON LAW INECONOMY AND SOCIETY 14 (Max Rheinstein ed.

& Edward Shils trans., 3d ed. 1965) (1920) [hereinafter LAW INECONOMY] ("'law' ...
mean[s] norms which are directly guaranteed by legal coercion"); Robert Cover, Violence
and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (characterizing judges' legal interpretations as
imposing violence on others); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L.

REV. 739, 741 (1982) ("All law is masked power.").
24

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19 at 104-05 ("[A]n arbitrary act would

be one performed without adequate determination of principle and one not founded in nature
of things.").
25 See HABERMAS, supranote 18 at 240-42; see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF

LAW 204-05 (rev. ed. 1969); Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural"Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L.

REV. 165, 168-69 (1982).
26
27

See HABERMAS, supranote 18, at 15-18.
This is the position of the legal positivists. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF

LAW 92, 199 (2d ed. 1994); MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF

CAPITALISM 26 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (1920).
28 LAW IN ECONOMY, supranote 23, at 61-67; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY

OF LEGISLATION 27-28 (Richard Hildreth trans., N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd. 1975) (1843);
HART, supra note 27, at 100-10.
29 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175

(1989).
30

LAW IN ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 63.

31See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use andAbuse ofPhilosophy in Legal Education,45
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could define rationality more broadly to include all arguments designed to appeal
to cognitive as opposed to emotional decision-making. 2 However, some scholars
argue that emotion cannot fully be separated from cognitive decisions and that any
attempt to make the distinction creates a false dichotomy.33 Others argue that
divorcing cognitive functions from emotion renders the process cold and
insensitive, so that we should privilege rather than penalize emotional appeals.34
Rationality also is associated with autonomy. An individual can only base her
conduct on reasoned arguments if she has the freedom to choose how to act or
speak.35 When she obeys higher authority without question, she acts on trust, duty,
or fear, rather than reason. Obedience can be rational in the sense that it is based
on the reasoned judgment that the higher authority is better informed, more
experienced, wiser, or more powerful and therefore to be trusted or feared.
Nevertheless, the actions themselves are justified not by rational argument, but by
trust, faith, or fear of the higher authority.
Finally, rationality often has an empirical component: it works in the real
world. An assertion is only well-grounded when there is some evidence to support
it. Often this evidence is drawn from practical experience. Thus, when courts
examine whether a legislative act is rationally related to its purposes, they often ask
how well the statute achieves its goals.3 6 Statutes that completely fail in their
STAN.

L. REV. 1627, 1634 (1993); D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based

Public Policy, 65 S. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 55, 56 (1997).
32 See LAW IN ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 63.
31 See Naomi R. Cahn; The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1405 (1992); Carolyn
Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Comment, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99
YALE L.J. 1913,1949-50 (1990); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L.

REV. 1574, 1575-76 (1987); Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for
Functioning, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1992); Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the
Language ofJudging, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 23, 27-28 (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1717-18 (1990); Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary

Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1140 (1990).

14 See Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women:
Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 352, 361 (1988) (reviewing

CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:

DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW

(1987)); Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women's Human Rights and
Strategies for Their Implementation, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 799, 809-11 (1996); Aviva
Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REv. 159, 190 (1997); Cheryl B. Preston, Consuming Sexism:
Pornography Suppression in the Larger Context of Commercial Images, 31 GA. L. REV.
771, 823-24 (1997); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence ofFeministJurisprudence: An Essay,
95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1383 (1986); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 797, 804 (1989).
35 See HABERMAS, supranote 18, at 14-15.
36 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,

539 (1993) (noting that the City's stated interest was to prohibit cruelty to animals, but a ban
solely on animal sacrifice and not other forms of cruelty did not achieve that goal); City of
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objectives may be held to be "irrational" and set aside.37 Although the legal tests
for rationality need not follow the strict rules of science, to be rational a decision
must have some empirical basis.3
Courts rarely use the narrow definition of formal logic when defining
rationality. Instead, courts tend to use a much broader definition of rationality that
includes any argument supported by reason, common sense, or evidence. 9 In order
for legislation to be considered rational, the legislators need not prove the truth of
the underlying assumptions. Instead, it is sufficient if a reasonable legislator could
believe the assumptions to be true.40 Indeed, in other contexts the Supreme Court
Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,449-450 (1985) (holding the City's goal of
preventing construction in a five-hundred-year flood plain was not achieved by requiring a
special building permit for a home for the mentally retarded but not for a nursing home,
sanitarium, or hospital); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding Oklahoma's
prohibition on males under age twenty-one buying 3.2% beer did not achieve the state's goal
of preventing drunk driving because the statute only applied to the purchase and not
consumption of beer); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,652 (1972) (holding that Illinois did
not serve any state goal when it separated children from fit parents).
" See generally Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (holding that
granting veterans' preferences to persons who were New York residents at the time they
joined the military but not to non-resident veterans is an irrational denial of equal
protection); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (holding that the "State may not rely on a
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary or irrational"); Hooper v. Bemalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612
(1985) (holding the "distinction New Mexico makes between veterans who established
residence before May 8, 1976, and those veterans who arrived in the State thereafter bears
no rational relationship to [any] one of the State's objectives"); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding Alabama could not rationally discriminate against
out-of-state companies to protect the domestic market); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14
(1985) (holding a Vermont statute permitting a tax exemption for vehicle registration, which
distinguished between residents and non-residents who later became Vermont residents, to
be arbitrary and irrational); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding a
gender-based distinction between widows and widowers with minor children who elected
to stay at home irrational); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding
that a rule requiring pregnant teachers to quit is arbitrary and irrational); USDA v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973) (holding a classification invalid because it "simply does not
operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud").
"' But see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,464 (1981) (holding
that empirical evidence is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that legislatures act
rationally so long as the issue is debatable).
39 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981); CloverLeafCreamery,449 U.S. at 464-65; N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568, 583 n.24 (1979).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 607 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have
a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
commerce, our investigation is at an end.") (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
303-4 (1964)); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
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has described
rationality very broadly to include any plausible support for an
4
argument. 1
The problem with such a broad definition is that "rational" and "irrational"
merely become labels for personal preferences. When decision-makers agree with
an argument, they find it to be persuasive, and therefore supported by reason.
Accordingly, they call the argument rational. When they disagree, the argument
seems unsupported by reason, and they label it irrational, or emotional. For
example, when abolitionists mounted constitutional challenges to slavery, the
arguments were dismissed as "emotional," while the arguments for the status quo
were viewed as rational.42 More recently, in Romer v. Evans,43 Justice Scalia
dismissed the majority's opinion protecting the political rights of homosexuals as
"emotive utterance.""4 To the extent that rational means fitting within a recognized
paradigm, arguments to sustain the status
quo will always seem more rational than
45
arguments to create new paradigms.
Fitting faith into a legal system that treasures rationality is a challenge.
Religion usually contains numerous non-rational components. Not all principles are
supported by reasoned argument. Instead, many religious views are accepted and
taught as matters of faith or received authority. Although some religious rules or
principles may be supported by arguments from sacred texts or religious tradition,
in general, these traditions and texts are not subject to empirical criticism or
autonomous decision-making. Indeed, many religious practices are transcendental
experiences that cannot be captured in the form of an argument at all. For instance,
meditation, sweat lodge ceremonies, and sacraments are all spiritual experiences
that cannot be reduced to logical arguments or explanations. Thus religion poses
several problems for a system committed to rationality.
II. How DOES THE COMMITMENT TO RATIONALITY AFFECT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?
Has the preference for rationality diminished religious liberty? The
commitment to rationality might affect religious freedom in three different ways.
First, the emphasis on rationality may risk marginalizing most religions because
they are based on faith. Second, the emphasis on rationality may unduly empower
government to enact limits on the scope of religious behavior. Third, the emphasis
on rationality may create preferences for those religions that are perceived to be
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.").
"'See,
42 See,

e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490-91.
e.g., State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 369 (1845). The court stated:

I have listened.., to the arguments... and the pathetic appeals ... in support
of [abolition] ...and whilst I most sincerely respect the zeal and humane spirit

by which they were dictated... I am nevertheless constrained to say, that much
of the argument seemed rather addressed to the feelings than to the legal
intelligence of the court.
Id

43 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

44 Id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (1962).
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more rational and disadvantage those faiths that are seen as irrational or
superstitious.
A. Has the Commitment to Rationality Createda GeneralizedHostility to
Religion?
Relatively little direct evidence exists. Some commentators have tried to link
diffuse cultural secularism to a decline in religious liberty.' Although we tend to
think of reason and rationality as peculiarly secular, that has not always been the
case. For example, Locke, who argued that reason was the well-spring of liberty,
used specifically religious references to support his arguments.47 Certainly our
culture is substantially more secularized now than at the time of the founding,48 and
the Court is less likely to use expressly religious language in its opinions. 9 Of
course, the prevailing cultural ethic that is secular, rational, and arguably hostile"°
to religion may permeate the Court without express evidence in opinions."
46

See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND

POLmCS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 23-26 (1993).
4'

References to God and to biblical stories are woven throughout Locke's work. See
Two TREATISES, supra note 6, at 7, 267-82, 285-86.
See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE COUSINS' WARS: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE

LOCKE,
48

TRIUMPH OF ANGLO-AMERICA 390-95 (1999); GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 352-53, 382 (1990).

" Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-68 (1878), with Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912-21 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting). In Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite uses expressly religious terms
to explain the Mormon practice of polygamy. PlannedParenthoodarguably had similar
religious significance. However, in Webster, Justice Stevens uses secular terms to declare
that, in order to be legitimate, a state's interest in human life cannot be based on theological
principles. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566-67 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion in Bowers lacked religious wording and arguments. However, ChiefJustice
Burger's concurrence explicitly references the prohibition of homosexual sodomy in JudeoChristian morals. The Romer case involved similar issues as Bowers, yet Justice Scalia's
dissent describes the prohibition of homosexual sodomy as a prohibition based on moral and
social grounds, not religion.
50 It is not clear that the public is hostile to religion. Public attitudes toward religion are
complex and varied both among the general population and elite groups. For a detailed
discussion of such attitudes, see generally TED G. JELEN & CLYDE WILCOX, PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD CHURCH AND STATE (1995) [hereinafter JELEN & WILCOX] (describing
statistical data demonstrating variance between the general population and elite groups on
attitudes about the role of religion in society, the separation of church and state, and
establishment issues).
"' Michael W. McConnell has argued that Justice Stevens' opinions are expressly antireligious. Michael W. McConnell, "God is Deadand We Have Killed Him! ": Freedomof
Religion in the Post-modernAge, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163; Michael W. McConnell, Free
ExerciseRevisionism andthe Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1132 n. 108 (1990)
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However, the Court's recent rulings give little evidence of such generalized hostility
to religion.
In fact, mainstream religions have fared very well before the Supreme Court in
the face of Establishment Clause claims. For example, Christian student groups
were entitled to claim funding from the University of Virginia;52 municipalities
were permitted to erect Christian religious displays like nativity scenes in public
parks;53 public schools were required to provide space for religious groups on the
same basis as they were provided to secular organizations;5 4 and parochial schools
were entitled to claim public funding. for some of their students." Although the
Court draws the line at prayer in public school settings, 6 generally most
Establishment Clause cases are decided in favor of the religion. Indeed,
Establishment Clause objections are most likely to be sustained when they are
raised as defenses to illegal conduct by religious entities. For example, when
religions are accused of discrimination, courts often refuse to decide the issue in
order to avoid entangling the government in religious affairs in violation of the
Establishment Clause." Such rulings unduly benefit organized religion, especially
Christian groups.5" Accordingly, there is little evidence of general hostility to
religion.'
B. Has the Commitment to Rationality Unduly Limited Religious Behavior?
Religions have not fared as well under the Free Exercise Clause. The problems
have a long history. The early disputes over free exercise were not cast as contests
[hereinafter McConnell, Smith]; Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:
A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 169 (1997); Michael W.
McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146, 154-55 (1986);
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of

Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins];Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CitI. L. REv. 115, 120 n.29, 123

(1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom].
2 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
3 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
•54 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
" Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
56 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting a public high school from
having a rabbi say a prayer at graduation); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding
that a moment of silence for meditation or prayer was unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that a non-denominational prayer in public school violated the
Establishment Clause).
17 See, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case
for Applying Employment DiscriminationLaws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1057
n.32 (1996) and the cases cited therein.
58 It is hard to measure the extent to which the Establishment Clause doctrine has
benefited non-Christian groups. When the Satmar Hadasim, an orthodox Jewish group,
created a public school for their disabled children, it was struck down on Establishment
Clause grounds. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,690
(1994).
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between rationality and faith. Instead, they were seen as conflicts between belief
and conduct. Individuals were free to believe whatever they wanted, but they had
to comply with the majority's rules for conduct. 9 For example, in Reynolds v.
United States, the Court drew a sharp distinction between Mormon faith and the
practice of polygamy." Mormons were free to believe that polygamy was divinely
inspired and encouraged, but were not free to act on those beliefs. Although the
Supreme Court rhetoric reflected this distinction between belief and conduct, the
federal government's attempt to seize the church property was a direct attack on the
the formal doctrine
institution of the church itself.6"' Only when the church changed
62
relent.
government
the
did
to reject a belief in polygamy
As the Mormon example suggests, these conflicts raised the specter of
government coercion to force believers to act contrary to their faith. No such
coercion was necessary for mainstream Protestants because their moral standards
of conduct were enshrined in law.63 Thus, insiders could comfortably comply with
both their faith and their legal duties, while outsiders had to limit their religious
lives. The distinction between faith and conduct enabled the Court to maintain the
appearance of tolerance while enforcing mainstream Protestant values. These
values were not perceived to be religious. Rather, they were the rational choices of
majoritarian legislatures. This distinction between the "rational" choices of
legislatures and courts, and the "religious" choices of outsider faiths enabled the
government to maintain a formal commitment to religious freedom while limiting
outsider religions.
As the Supreme Court struggled with this history of favoritism, it relied
increasingly on the concept of "neutrality," which the Court interpreted as formal

See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id at 166 ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
61 See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1887, § 17, 24 Stat. 638 (dissolving the Church of LatterDay Saints and authorizing seizure of its property); see also Church of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding congressional legislation that dissolved the
church and forfeited its property).
62 See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (noting that polygamy had
been outlawed by the Mormons since 1889 and that Mormon fundamentalists practicing
polygamy were in violation of Church law and the Mann Act).
63 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Good God,Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility of
a Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35, 40 (1998)
("Garvey was clear: a distinctly Protestant viewpoint was constitutionally enshrined.");
Douglas W. Kmiec, God's Litigator, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1247, 1253-54 (1995)
s9
6o

(reviewing

WILLIAM BENTLY BALL, MERE CREATURES OF THE STATE? EDUCATION,
RELIGION, AND THE COURTS: A VIEW FROM THE COURTROOM 4 (1994) (arguing that state

constitutions that prohibit funding sectarian schools do so as an anti-Catholic measure);
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics,60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685,714 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation]
(noting that historically the law was very accommodating to the "largely Protestant
population of the states as of 1789").
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equality theory." The government acted neutrally toward religion if it treated
religion the same as non-religion or if it treated all sects the same. This line of cases
culminated in Employment Division,Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith.65 There, the Court held thatno free exercise claims could arise against any
"neutral law of general applicability."
Specifically, it meant that Native
Americans could not claim religious freedom for their sacramental use of peyote.
From 1963 to 1990 the general rule had been that the government needed 67a
compelling state interest to justify an 'intrusion on the free exercise of religion.
Although the rule seemed to require strict scrutiny, most free exercise challenges
were unsuccessful. 68 Nevertheless, governments were obliged to confront the
balance they had struck between individual conscience and public interest. In
theory, at least, this requirement created an incentive for the state to accommodate
faith-based conduct and discouraged the state from strictly enforcing laws that
impeded religious practice. After Smith, the presumption shifted in favor of state
regulation, and a claimant was required to prove that the state had singled out a
specific religion for discrimination.69
Congress reacted by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
that reinstated the compelling state interest test."0 The Supreme Court promptly
held the RFRA to be unconstitutional and reaffirmed the general applicability test
64 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
540 (1993) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting animal slaughter was specifically targeted
to prohibit Santeria rites and was therefore discriminatory and not neutral); Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (holding that rules requiring social security numbers were neutral
so long as they did not intentionally discriminate against any particular faith); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 521 (1986).(holding that the Army could prohibit soldiers from
wearing yarmulkes under a neutral rule specifying a particular uniform); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (holding that tax deductions for contributions to
religious institutions were neutral because they did not discriminate among religions).
6' 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
67 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind., Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
(holding that a "state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least
restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (holding that "only those [state] interests of the highest order ... can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406-09 (1963) (holding that a compelling state interest was necessary in order to
infringe upon the appellant's free exercise rights).
68 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(rejecting a free exercise challenge to a road built through sacred land); Tony & Susan
Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (rejecting a free exercise challenge
to the minimum wage laws); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(rejecting a free exercise claim to be free from race discrimination rules in the tax code);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting a free exercise claim of the Amish not
to pay social security taxes).
69 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
70

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
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in City of Boerne v. Flores." In Boerne, the Court held that a Roman Catholic
parish could not expand its own church building to provide more space for religious
services and functions because the changes were barred by landmark provisions
which constituted "neutral laws of general application.""2 Permitting "neutral laws
ofgeneral application" to supercede religious practices nearly extinguishes the Free
Exercise Clause. Now a claimant can only prevail if she can show that a regulation
specifically targeted a particular religious group for discrimination."
The very idea that there are "neutral" principles of "general application" is a
commitment to traditional notions of rationality. This idea of "objective"
lawmakers who are completely independent of their faiths presumes that rationality
precedes, and is superior to, non-rational religious views. In a post-modernist
world, such an objective position has been seriously questioned. 4 It assumes that
general secular norms are available and are uninfluenced by any particular religious
viewpoint. Surely all of us are influenced, both consciously and unconsciously, by
our backgrounds and beliefs. Empirically, the claim that legislators are religiously
independent is hard to sustain given the evidence of religious interest group
lobbying and political power." Thus, the problem with an emphasis on rationality
is less that religion as a whole is marginalized than that free exercise has been
unduly restricted.
C. Does the Commitment to Rationality Favor Some Faiths Over Others?
As the Mormon example suggests, the commitment to reason sometimes creates
7" 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Boerne has been severely criticized in the academic literature.
See generally J. Thomas Berg, Religious Freedom After Boerne, 2 NEXUS 91 (1997)
(critiquing Boerne for its insistence that the Supreme Court is the exclusive source of
wisdom about the meaning of the Constitution); Thomas L. DeBusk, Comment, RFRA
Came, RFRA Went; Where Does that Leave the FirstAmendment? City of Boeme v. Flores,
10 REGENT U. L. REv. 223 (1998) (arguing that Boerne renders the Free Exercise Clause
meaningless); Robert Hoff, Losing Our Religion: The Constitutionalityof The Religious
Freedom RestorationAct Pursuantto Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, 64 BROOK.
L. REV. 377 (1998) (criticizing Boerne for diminishing religious liberty); R. Collin
Mangrum, The FallingStar of Free Exercise: Free ExerciseandSubstantive Due Process
Entitlement Claims in City of Boeme v. Flores, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 693 (1998)
(critiquing Boerne and recommending that the Supreme Court restore the Free Exercise
Clause to its status as a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation") (quoting W.Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943)); J. Brent Walker, Religious Liberty: An
EndangeredRight, 2 NEXUS 63 (1997) (critiquing the Court's use of federalism and
separation of powers principles in Boerne, preferring a robust principle of religious liberty).
72 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 538.
" See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
74 See, e.g., STEvEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 64, 77-78 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH,
FAILURE]; Fish, Get Along, supra note 3, at 18-26; Kent Greenawalt, On Public Reason, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669, 688 (1994).
" See, e.g., WILBUR EDEL, DEFENDERS OFTHE FAITH: RELIGION AND POLITICS FROM THE
PILGRIM FATHERS TO RONALD REAGAN 124-59 (1987).
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hierarchies of insiders and outsiders. Locke suggested that liberty itself is linked
to reason. 76 Those who possess superior reason are free to exercise authority over
7
those whose reasoning is inherently impaired.7 Hence, fathers govern children;
masters govern slaves;"9 and husbands govern wives." Arguably then, those who
rely on reason and evidence may exercise authority over those who rely on faith or
revelation. Although the courts have not expressly articulated such a position, that
is one way to read cases like Reynolds8 or Smith, 2 which authorize legislatures to
limit religious practices. In essence, legislatures are presumed to be "neutral" 3 or
"objective"'" in making "rational""5 judgments about the general limits on tolerable
76

LOCKE, TwO TREATISES, supra note 6, at 35 ("The Freedom then of Man and Liberty

of acting according to his own Will is grounded on his having Reason.. ").
7 Thus Locke argued that those who lack the capacity to develop reason ("lunaticks and
ideols") are perpetually subject to the authority of their parents or other caretakers, and never
truly free. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 6, at 33-34.
78 Locke maintained that children were subject to parental control because they lacked
the ability to reason that would develop with age. Liberty inhered in the human condition
because of the inborn capacity to develop reason, but full liberty did not arise until reason
was fully developed at adulthood. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 6, at 30-42.
"' Slaves posed something of a problem for Locke. Since the capacity to reason provides
the key to freedom, slaves who could reason should be freed. Locke's solution was to then
tie liberty to the capacity to hold- property. For Locke, the protection of property is the
primary purpose of society. Thus slaves, who could not hold property, were subject to
others because they were wholly outside civil society. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note
6, at 45.
8o See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 6, at 44 ("But the Husband and Wife ... will
unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary, that the last
Determination, i.e. the Rule, should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the Man's
share, as the abler and the stronger.").
s, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
82 Employment Div. Dep't. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
83 See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (concluding that districting
legislation is ordinarily presumed to be race-neutral); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,
452-53 (1991) (presuming the Arkansas legislature passed a content-neutral sales tax);
Messe v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987) ("[W]e normally owe [respect] to the
Legislature's power to define the terms that it uses ... [and] we simply view this particular
choice of language, [as] statutorily defined in a neutral and evenhanded manner...."); Pers.
Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,274 (1979) (holding a veteran's preference statute
was presumed neutral on its face because no overt gender animus was present).
84 See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-80 (presuming Massachusetts legislature to have
acted in an objective manner unless it was demonstrated that they had a "[d]iscriminatory
purpose"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 222 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.") (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425 (1961)); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 48-51
(1973) (holding that even though the school funding scheme resulted in inequality it was
necessary to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose to overcome the presumption that the
legislature acted objectively).
85 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,464 (1981) (holding
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behavior. These supposedly rational, objective, and neutral judgments of the
majority are entitled to greater weight than individual religious "beliefs."
In fact, however, the accepted view that is considered "rational" or "neutral"
often merely reflects the religious preferences of the majority. Hence, it is "neutral"
to permit Sunday closing laws to give workers a day at rest, even though those
Sunday closing laws penalize Sabbatarians (like Jews and Seventh Day Adventists),
who close their businesses on Saturday." Similarly, it is "neutral" to permit tax
exemptions for religious contributions. 7
Read together, these cases undermine both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. They permit government both to regulate religions as in
Boerne,8 or Smith,89 and to directly subsidize religious institutions, as in
Rosenberger9° and Agostini.9 ' These changes in the law reduce the religion clauses
into versions of free speech92 or equal protection. Religion loses its special place
that "States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative
judgments" even when plaintiffs allege the legislation is irrational); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (holding that legislatures are presumed to have acted
constitutionally).
86 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
87 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
88 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
89 Employment Div. Dep't. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
90 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
' Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
92 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 845 (ordering the university to pay for publication
costs of religious publications to avoid "a denial of the right of free speech"); Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 510 U.S. 1307 (1993) (allowing private parties to erect
a large Latin cross in front of the Ohio Statehouse as a form of free speech); see also Robert
D. Kamenshine, Scrapping StrictReview in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY
147, 147-54 (1987) (arguing that the Court should use the balancing test for both free
exercise and free speech cases due to the similarity between the two issues); William P.
Marshall, In Defense of the Searchfor Truth as a FirstAmendment Justification,30 GA. L.
REv. 1, 11-16 (1995) [hereinafter Marshall, Search for Truth] (identifying instances in
which free speech and the Free Exercise Clause have been intertwined); William P.
Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religionas Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385,392-96
(1996) [hereinafter, Marshall, Ideas] (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of viewing
free exercise claims as free speech claims); William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise
Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545,547-53 (1983) (arguing that
the Free Exercise Clause could be treated as a form of free speech). But see Marci A.
Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Jurisprudence:A TheologicalAccount ofthe Failureto ProtectReligious Conduct,54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 713,737 (1993) (disagreeing with Marshall's premise "that the Free Speech Clause
protects belief in the same way that the Free Exercise Clause does"); Stanley Ingber,
Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarificationof the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV.
233, 241-46 (1989) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause gives greater protection to
religious expression than does the Free Speech Clause alone).
" See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507 (denying a Free Exercise Clause claim and
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in the constitutional framework. The new emphasis on rational and universally
applicable rules implies that religion is not special.
III. Is RELIGION SPECIAL?
A debate is flourishing in scholarly literature about whether religion should get
special treatment from the government." Sometimes religious individuals or
entities request exemptions from generally applicable laws citing the Free Exercise
Clause," while other times, secular individuals or entities seek to exclude religious
groups from government benefits or subsidies as violations of the Establishment
Clause." In both instances, the question comes down to why religions should be
treated differently. Religions can only be entitled to special treatment if we know
what constitutes a religion.97
holding that the Catholic Church must be treated equally with other applicants for land use
variances); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (holding that the university must treat all student
groups equally, and therefore must pay to print evangelical fliers); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (holding that if a public school
permits outside groups like the Boy Scouts to use its facilities, it must permit religious

groups to do so on an equal basis).
' See generally John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7
J.CONTEMP. LEGALISSUES 275,286-91 (1996) [hereinafter Garvey, Anti-LiberalArgument];
Gedicks, supra note 4 at 569-74; Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering
the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses ofthe First Amendment, 52 U.
Prir. L. REV. 75 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs 313, 314-16 (1996); Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty:
A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 359 (1996);
William P. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith andFree Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
308 (1991); McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 63, at 717; McConnell, Origins, supra
note 51, at 1414-15; McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 51, at 125; Stephen Pepper,
Conflicting Paradigms ofReligious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 BYU L. REV.
7, 12.
"' See, e.g., City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 507 (addressing exemption from landmark status
sought for Roman Catholic Church that wanted to expand); Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (addressing exemption from employment
division rules sought for an individual discharged for use of peyote during Native American
sacrament).
96 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819 (denying a challenge to a subsidy for a
religious student group at a state university); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203 (permitting state-paid
special education teachers to teach at parochial schools); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 753; Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at I (requiring a school district to provide school facilities for religious
groups to the same extent the facilities were provided to secular groups); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (permitting a school district to pay the salary of a
sign language interpreter for a deaf child attending Catholic school); Westside Cmty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
9"See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J.dissenting) ("In one
important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free
Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional
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A. How Should Religion be Defined?
This question is extremely difficult, and one that the Court has frequently
avoided. One way courts have avoided this question is to focus on the sincerity of
the adherent's views, even when they diverge from other members of the same
sect.9" Thus, in United States v. Seeger,99 the Court defined religion as "a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful [and] occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.""°
Sincerity offers little to distinguish religion from other philosophies. Marxists,
Presbyterians, and anarchists may all be equally sincere. Hence, this standard
depends on whether the views "occup[y] a place... parallel to... [the] orthodox
belief in God."' 0 ' It is unclear whether that standard is merely a measure of the
subjective importance of the faith to the believer, or whether the standard requires
a more theistic element. Either way, the definition is likely to be hard to apply to
generalized spiritual orders like those experienced by Native American faiths or
Eastern religions like Zen Buddhism.
However, a more generalized sincerity standard without a theistic component
defines many deeply held moral convictions to be religious. 2 In order to
distinguish merely personal morality from religion, Justice Harlan suggested that
to be considered religious, deeply held moral views would have to be shared with
a "recognizable and cohesive group."'0 3 One problem with this approach is that it
fails to account for the role of individual conscience in religion. Thus, it risks
quashing religious dissent by privileging the views of religious institutions over
religious individuals. For example, Sonia Johnson, the prominent feminist who was
excommunicated by the Church of Latter-day Saints, remains a faithful and deeply
spiritual person.0 4 Under Justice Harlan's group-based approach, such a dissident
would not have religious views "shared by a recognizable cohesive group" and
would be denied free exercise protection. This poses problems for the many
individuals who find themselves unwelcome in any recognized faith even though
they are deeply religious.'
rights that other strongly held beliefs do not."); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind., 450 U.S. 707,
713(1981).
98 See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
99 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

10o Id. at 166.
'O' Id at 163.
102 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) ("If an individual deeply
and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content.., those
beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual 'a place parallel to that filled by...
God' in traditionally religious persons.").
103 Id at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring).
'o
See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, andAbortion: TowardLove, Compassion,and
Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1034 (1989).
"o' Some feminists feel excluded from most religious traditions. For a discussion of this
problem, see MARY DALY, THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX 53-73 (1985) (discussing the
extent to which the Catholic Church oppresses women); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of
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Justice Harlan may have wanted to define religion communally in order to
reduce the risk of self-serving declarations of faith. For example, tax exclusions for
'parsonages create incentives for enterprising souls to declare themselves "ministers"
solely to claim their homes as-rectories or parsonages." ° Requiring evidence of a
congregation reduces this risk offraud. However, other mechanisms exist to control
fraud that are less intrusive on individual rights of conscience. For instance, serious
Establishment Clause limits may deter some fraudulent claims by forcing those
claiming Free Exercise rights to forego government subsidies. Thus, the incentive
to claim fraudulently the "rectory" on income tax returns vanishes if the tax benefit
is viewed as an unconstitutional subsidy under the Establishment Clause. Because
we are unsure of precisely what constitutes a religion, it is impossible to ever weed
out all fraudulent or self-serving claims. Ultimately, we may have to decide
whether we are willing to err on the side of religious liberty with its concomitant
risk of fraud.
Nevertheless, courts have struggled to distinguish religious from moral or
philosophical claims.'
Consequently, scholars have attempted a variety of
definitions, none of which seem entirely satisfactory.' Kent Greenawalt, who is
Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective,59 U. CHI. L. REV.
453 (1992) [hereinafter Becker, Wrongs]; Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of
Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis
Under the United Nations Charter,35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271 (1997) (arguing that
fundamentalism in Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism explicitly attempts

to subordinate women).
'06 I.R.C. § 107 (1994).
107 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,216 (1972) (distinguishing Amish claims
to be free from compulsory high school education from "philosophical and personal" choices
such as those embraced by Thoreau); Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F.Supp. 730, 734 (D. N.J.
1983), affid, 738 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1984) (refusing to "[lI]et conscience be your guide" stand
as a religion).
'0 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLTICALCHOICE 30-31
(1988) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS]; William B. Ball, What is
Religion?, 8 CHRISTIAN LAW 7 (1979); Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the
Constitution: A ClassificationProblem, I1 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1977); A. Stephen Boyan,
Jr., Defining Religion in Operationaland Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479
(1968); Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579, 597-604 (suggesting that religion should be defined by "extra temporal consequences");
Ben Clements, Comment, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment: A Functional
Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532 (1989); George C. Freeman, Ill, The MisguidedSearch
for the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Toward a ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 99; Gey, supra note 94, at 75; Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A
Needed Clarificationof the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); R. Collin
Mangrum, Naming Religion (and Eligible Cognates) in Tax Exemption Cases, 19
CREIGHTON L. REV. 821 (1986); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986); Gail Merel, The
Protectionof Individual Choice: A Consistent Understandingof Religion Under the First
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skeptical of a complete definition, suggests that religions include "a belief in
transcendent reality, forms of worship and contemplation, experiences of the
'Holy,' ideas of sacred authority, myths and doctrines that interpret reality... [and]
embody ethical teachings.""° Admittedly, Greenawalt's description is patterned on
Judeo-Christian religions and seems to omit faiths that place less emphasis on
theistic notions of the transcendent, such as Buddhism." 0 Indeed, in the twentieth
century, the theological trend has been away from traditional notions of the deity
to a more open form of religion. Thus, for example, one influential theologian has
defined "God" as the "ultimate reality" or "inexhaustible depth" claiming that "he
who knows about depth knows about God.""' Courts have tended to follow these
trends, defining religion expansively."' For example, one court defined religion as
the "underlying theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe.""' 3
Such broad definitions of the divine make it difficult to distinguish religion
from philosophy, ethics, or morality."' Ultimately these distinctions are bound to
fail unless we are willing to adopt such a narrow and historical definition of religion
that it excludes large categories of individuals who genuinely believe themselves
to be engaged in religious practices. If matters of secular conscience are largely
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805 (1978); Charles M. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal
Revenue Code: The DefinitionalProblems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885 (1977); Richard 0.
Frame, Note, Belief in a NonmaterialReality-A ProposedFirstAmendment Definition of
Religion, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 819; Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane:
A FirstAmendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139 (1982); Craig A. Mason,
Note, "SecularHumanism "andthe DefinitionofReligion: ExtendingaModified "Ultimate

Concern" Test to Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools and Smith v. Board of School
Commissioners, 63 WASH. L. REv. 445 (1988); Eduardo Penalver, Note, The Concept of
Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791 (1997).
10'GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 108, at 30-31.
11' See, e.g., LAROUSSE DICTIONARY OF BELIEFS AND RELIGIONS 78 (Rosemary Goring
et al. eds., 1994).
...PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 64 (1962).
2 To make the problem of definition even more complex, some have suggested that
religion should be defined broadly for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and narrowly
for purposes of the Establishment Clause. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1186 (2d ed. 1988).
...Founding Church of Scientology of Wash. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969). A number of courts have followed
similar approaches. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983)
(defining religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude,
so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the
divine" (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1910));
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981) (referring to religion as
addressing fundamental concerns comprehensively).
'" Nevertheless, courts have tried to distinguish the two. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (distinguishing Amish claims to be free from compulsory high
school education from "philosophical and personal" choices such as those embraced by
Thoreau); Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D.N.J. 1983) (refusing to "[l]et
conscience be your guide" stand as a religion), affd, 738 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1984).
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indistinguishable from religious views,' 5 then why should religion be treated
differently, with special Free Exercise benefits or Establishment Clause limits?
C.

Why Should Religion Be Treated Differently than Other Philosophies?

Scholars have posited a number of reasons to treat religion differently from
other moral philosophies including the text of the First Amendment, history, the
inherent value of religion, eternal consequences, and preventing violence and
persecution.' 1 6 For some textualists,' 7 it does not matter why religion is special.
It is sufficient that the religion clauses were included in the First Amendment. That
argument fails to justify the inclusion of religious exceptions in our constitutional
scheme. If no rationale remains for including religious preferences, then arguably
the Court is correct to minimize the impact of the religion clauses, and we should
repeal them. On a more pragmatic level, the argument also fails. We need to have
an explanation of why religion is unique in order to help courts decide whether
special treatment is warranted and how much special treatment to give religion.
The historical arguments that the Framers of the First Amendment meant to
create exemptions from generally applicable laws, or that religions were to receive
government benefits on the same terms as others, are contested".. and suffer from
"1 Gedicks, supra note 4, at 563 (arguing that the moral positions of secular individuals
are entitled to the same respect as the moral positions of religious individuals).

116

Gedicks, supra note 4, at 558-68.

"' See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Libertyas Liberty, 7 J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313, 314 (1996); McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 63, at 717; Pepper, supranote 94,

at 12.
...Many scholars reject the idea that the Framers of the First Amendment intended the
Free Exercise Clause to create exemptions from generally applicable laws. See MICHAEL J.
MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDEMENT (1978); SMITH, FAILURE, supranote 74, at 37-43 (1995); Gerard V. Bradley,
Beguiled- Free Exercise Exemptions andthe Siren Song ofLiberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
245,251-306 (1991); Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the UnitedStates: A Turning

Point?, 1966 WIS. L.REV. 217,234 (noting the absence of Free Exercise Clause exemptions
in cases prior to 1940); Gedicks, supra note 4, at 561-62 (arguing that Sherbert v. Verner
and Yoder were the exceptions to a long tradition of rejecting religious exemptions to
generally applicable laws); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916, 926, 947-48
(1992) (challenging the historical accuracy of McConnell's arguments); Ellis West, The
Case Against a Right to Religion-BasedExemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y. 591, 619-20 (1990) (arguing that the Founders had differences of opinion about how
to protect religious freedom).
Even those who make originalist arguments in favor of such exemptions have only

weak support gathered from the fact that a few exemptions existed at the time. See
McConnell, Origins, supra note 51, at 1414-15. But see Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of
Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117 (criticizing McConnell's historical
methods).
Similarly, it is not clear whether the Framers of the First Amendment intended
religions to receive government benefits. See, e.g., ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J.
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some of the same problems as the textualist arguments. Whatever the views of the
Framers," 9 we need a plausible current explanation for treating religion differently
in order tojustify continued adherence to these principles. Otherwise, the argument
comes down to one of pure interest group politics; religious groups had the clout to
get exceptions written into the Constitution hundreds of years ago, and we are all
bound by that until we can get a sufficient super-majority to change it in favor of
current secular interest groups. To be worthy of continued respect and application,
the religion clauses must provide a more principled case for special treatment.
Those who argue that religion must be treated differently because religion is
inherently good' ° make precisely such a principled argument, but it is one that
cannot be evaluated objectively. Indeed, the subjective nature of virtue is precisely
the kind of policy question that is traditionally left up to legislatures to decide under
rubrics like the "general welfare."'' Nor does inherent virtue explain why religious
institutions were singled out for special treatment. Other institutions like the
EMMERICH, A NAION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE

OF THE RELIGION CLAUSE 21-31 (1990) (noting that Thomas Jefferson opposed government
funding for religion, and James Madison, while President, vetoed incorporating the
Episcopal Church in Washington, D.C., and reserved federal land for a Baptist Church);
Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson andBills Number 82-86 ofthe Revision ofthe Laws
of Virginia, 1776-1786. New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State Relations,
69 N.C. L. REV. 159, 163-68 (1990) (noting that Patrick Henry supported a bill that would
have given funding to churches. This bill was disliked by Thomas Jefferson and died in
committee.).
Nevertheless, it does seem more evident that the Establishment Clause originally was
meant to prevent the adoption of a national religion, leaving open the possibility of stateestablished religions. See SMITH, FAILURE, supra note 74, at 26-30 (1995); Raoul Berger,
Federalism: The Founders' Design-Responseto Michael McConnell, 57 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 51 n.3 (1988) (noting that during the First Congress' debates on the First Amendment,
"[s]tate authority over religion was left intact"); Van Foreman McClellan, Comment,
Edwards v. Aguillard: The Creationist-EvolutionistBattle Continues, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 631, 637 n.42 (1988) (analyzing the First Congress' views on financial support for
religion and noting that the Senate rejected a suggested amendment by James Madison due
to a concern with "preserving the idea that the various states were free to govern their own
relationships with the church, free from any interference by the federal government.").
" Note that a stronger case can be made that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to create free exercise exemptions that would apply to the states. See generally Kurt
T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions under
the FourteenthAmendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
20 See, e.g., Garvey, Anti-LiberalArgument, supra note 94, at 286-91; John H. Garvey,
All Things Being Equal. .. , 1996 BYU L. REV. 587, 604-609; see also Larry Alexander,
Good God, Garvey! The InevitabilityandImpossibility of a Religious Justificationof Free
Exercise Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35 (1998); Gregory C. Sisk, Statingthe Obvious:
Protecting Religion for Religon's Sake, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 45 (1998); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense ofReligious Freedom, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1597 (1997) (book review).
121 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (the spending clause which gives Congress the power
to collect taxes for the "general Welfare").
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family, that historically were perceived to be inherently good; did not receive
comparable constitutional protection. As other critics have noted, religions do not
have the monopoly on virtue, nor are all religions necessarily virtuous.' Many
moral actors are motivated bysecular purposes, like non-religious pacifists,'23 while
some religions have acted in-manifest disregard of virtue. 24 Defending religious
liberty on the basis that religion is inherently good raises the specter of a legislature
deciding which religions are good enough to warrant special protection.
Those who argue that religion can be distinguished from other philosophies by
its emphasis on the supernatural offer a more persuasive justification for special
treatment.'
For example, one scholar notes: "[R]eligion stands for an array of
different trends and traits bound together by their reference to a supposed
supernatural reality."'2 6 Supernatural events are rarely discoverable by observation
or reason. Hence, there is a long tradition of trying to access the supernatural
through trances, psychedelic substances, or vision quests.' Other faiths rely on
divine revelation for information about the supernatural world.'28 However, some
religions do not. require any commitment to the supernatural. For example,
Unitarian Universalists do not necessarily place any emphasis on other worldly
experiences and are largely indistinguishable from secular humanists.'29
Some faiths focus on a particular aspect of the super-natural: eternal
consequences. Individuals who adhere to these religions are uniquely 3 ' subject to

1

Gedicks, supra note 4, at 566-68.
See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

'24

See, e.g., CHRISTINE ELIZABETH KING, THE NAZI STATE AND THE NEW RELIGIONS:

2

FIVE CASE STUDIES INNON-CONFORMrrY 11-17 (1982) (discussing the role of various
religious institutions in supporting Nazis and Hitler); Merle H. Weiner, "Civilizing" the
Next Generation: A Response to Civility: Manners, Morals & the Etiquette of Democracy
by Stephen L. Carter, 42 HOW. L.J. 241,269-70 (1999) (describing how "religion has been
exploited by those who practice genocide, sexual abuse, and discrimination on the basis of
race, gender or sexual orientation"). See generally MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER
(1973); MARY DALY, THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX (1968) (explaining how the
Roman Catholic Church oppresses women); JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V.
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 14-15, 20-44, 174-76 (1998) (suggesting that many religious schools
engage in practices that damage children).
/
12 See, e.g., John Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN.
L. REV. 779,798-801 (1986) [hereinafter Garvey, Free Exercise]; Anand Agneshwar, Note,
Rediscovering God in the Constitution, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 319-21 (1992).
126 AKE HULTKRANTZ, THE ATTRACTION OF PEYOTE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE BASIC
CONDITIONS FOR THE DIFFUSION OF THE PEYOTE RELIGION INNORTH AMERICA 165 (1977).
See id
,28
See, e.g., JOHN PAUL II, ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON: FIDES
127

ET RATIO 14-20 (1998).
29 In the ten articles of faith published by the Unitarian Universalists, there is no mention
of God or any other deity or supernatural event. Instead, Unitarian Universalists express
belief in freedom of religion, toleration, reason, equality, dignity, good works, love,
democracy, and community. See Unitarian Universalist Association, What Do Unitarian
Universalists Believe?.
"3' Of course, ifthe religious are correct on this score, some non-religious individuals may

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:2

the risk of divine and eternal punishment.' Less discussed is the similar idea that
religion can also offer eternal rewards that may induce the truly faithful to place
religious commands over secular ones.'32 Of course, many religions do not
expressly incorporate theories of eternal reward or punishment, and therefore
arguably would be excluded from any such justification of the First Amendment.
At the core of this approach is the notion that reason alone cannot persuade those
bound by eternal consequences.
This supra-rational approach has pragmatic consequences. If an individual
believes that he is going to Hell for all eternity, no earthly punishment, even the
death penalty, will act as a sufficient deterrent to religiously mandated conduct.
Thus, those who are religiously motivated are, at least theoretically, less likely to
be deterred by law. Therefore, supra-rational religious disputes are less likely to be
resolved by rational deliberative politics. The persistence of mutually devastating
religious disputes in Ireland and the Middle East attest to the difficulties of rational
resolution of such problems.. Once the deeply held and supra-rational nature of
religious belief is acknowledged, then religion poses a threat of serious divisiveness
and, all too often, violence.' Pragmatically, this threat of violence has been a
strong motivator for religious liberty. Nevertheless, this analysis is troubling.
Privileging religion because religious individuals hold irrational preferences that
cannot be deterred is like giving in to a bully. We know that this behavior cannot
be justified, but we tolerate it because it is too hard to control. We need a more
principled basis for religious liberty than mere fear of violence.
Of course, the duty to obey God is not solely dependent on eternal
consequences. Obedience to a higher authority is a crucial part of many faiths, and
was argued to be part of the legal definition of religion: "The essence of religion
is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation."' 34 An over-arching duty to God renders religion less susceptible
to state control. Religious adherents are subject to a conflict of loyalties between

also be at risk for eternal damnation but are simply ignorant of the risk.
"' See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND

POLITIcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 275-76 (1993); Garvey, Anti-LiberalArgument,
supra note 94, at 286.
32 For example, Muslims believe that if they die during a holy war or Jihad, they will go
to heaven. See, e.g., THE HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARYOF RELIGION 687 (Jonathan Z. Smith
et al. eds., 1995); GEOFFREY PARRINDER, A DICTIONARY OF NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS 143
(1971).
133See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under
the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 323, 340-41; Douglas Laycock, Continuity and
Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth
Century, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1091-93 (1996); Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and
ProtectLiberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
357, 360-64 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and LiberalDemocracy, 59 U.CHI. L.
REv. 195 (1992).
131 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (193 1) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting),
overruledby 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
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their government and their God that the non-religious do not suffer.'3
Legislatures, as arms of the government, are peculiarly unsuited to mediate
conflicts between church and state, both because they have no claim to authority
and because they have a conflict of interest. Without a valid claim to authority,
government attempts to regulate religious behavior seem illegitimate and likely to
prevail only if the measures to enforce the rules are sufficiently coercive.
If attempts to regulate religiously motivated conduct are more likely to fail, then
such regulations may pose more danger than they are worth because they undermine
the legitimacy of the rule of law. They do so in two different ways. First,
unenforceable rules highlight the limits of the rule of law and may encourage
disobedience in general. Second, the attempt to impose government authority over
the omnipotent authority of God places government in the role of immoral usurper.
Hence, concepts of the supernatural and the possibility of eternal consequences
have been used to explain carving out a special role for religion.
Such arguments rest on a pragmatic judgment that religious views are likely to
be strongly held, highly valued, and not easily susceptible to change. In that regard,
they may not be significantly different from non-religious moral views. For
instance, a secular pacifist may hold his views just as strongly, value them just as
highly, and be equally resistant to state coercion. Similarly, he may be just as
convinced that the state's attempt to force him to engage in warfare is immoral.
D. Does the Supra-RationalCharacterof Religion Make it Special?
Religion is often distinguished from other philosophies in part because it is
peculiarly non-rational. Recall the various definitions of rationality: (1) decisions
are based on reasoned argument, not coercion or obligation; (2) decisions cannot be
encompassed within arbitrary edicts, but must be supported by principled norms;
(3) decisions are based on cognitive, as opposed to emotional, appeals; (4) decisions
are made autonomously, not in response to authority; and (5) decisions are
empirically based. Religion arguably defies each of these definitions of rationality.
Rational decisions can be contrasted with arbitrary ones. Arbitrary decisions
are made without supporting reasons so they must be imposed by power or
authority. Many religions rely on claims of authority to impose rules with or
without detailed explanations. For example, the United Methodist Church relies on
its Book of Discipline to establish the rules of membership.' Similarly, the Amish
have a strict duty to obey the elders,' as do the Mormons.' Notions of authority
'..

125.
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Lupu, supra note 133, at 357, 359; McConnell, Religious Freedom, supranote 51, at
THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED

METHODIST CHURCH 112-15, 123-25 (1980).
,31 See JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 14-I5, 159, 167 (4th ed. 1993) ("[W]isdom

of the aged carries more weight than the advice of younger men ... authority is vested in the
old people. This arrangement naturally lends itself to control of life by the aged."); DONALD
B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 98-99 (1989) ("Abandoning self and
bending to the collective wisdom place the obedient in touch with God."); Maryann Schlegel
Ruegger, An Audience for the Amish:

A Communication Based Approach to the
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are closely tied -to articles of faith for many religions. For some religions, the
authority is thought to derive originally from God, and then be passed literally down
to the religious hierarchy.' 39 Thus, obedience to religious authority may rest partly
on power rather than reason. Indeed, at one point in our history the Supreme Court
defined religion as "reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to
the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
obedience to his will."' 40 To the extent that religion depends on unexplained
obedience to authority, it is non-rational.
If reliance on authority renders religion non-rational, it is not uniquely so. Law
also requires unexplained obedience to authority. For example, if ajudge issues an
injunction without notice or hearing, the injunction must be followed, even if the
judge lacked the authority to issue it.' 4' Failure to obey such an injunction is
punishable by criminal contempt that can result in fines and jail. 42 Indeed, a
number of non-religious settings required unreasoned obedience to authority. For
example, soldiers must follow orders, regardless of how reasonable, and employees
often must obey their supervisors.
Religion is also viewed as non-rational because spirituality may be felt rather
than thought. Religion often makes both cognitive and emotional appeals.
Although we do not necessarily describe religion as emotional, it makes expressly
spiritual, as opposed to purely cognitive, demands on religious adherents. These
spiritual demands often stress transcendental experiences that depend more on
feeling than thought. Often the goal of these experiences is to remove individuals
from their self-centered thoughts onto a higher spiritual plane. For example,
Buddhists use meditation; 43 Native Americans use peyote'" or sweat lodges; 45 and

Development of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 801, 802 n.2 (1991).
"'1See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD FAITHS: AN ILLUSTRATED SURVEY OF THE
WORLD'S LIVING RELIGIONS 152 (Peter Bishop & Michael Darton eds., 1988); THE HARPER
COLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 653 (Jonathon Z. Smith et al. eds. 1995).
'19 See, e.g., JOHN A. HARDON, S.J., MODERN CATHOLIC DICTIONARY 313 (1980); OUR
SUNDAY VISITOR'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE 285 (Russell Shaw ed. 1997).
140 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), overruled by
141See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
142

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

See id.at 320.

143 See, e.g.,

THOMAS BERRY, RELIGIONS OF INDIA: HINDUISM, YOGA, BUDDHISM 155-57

(1992) (describing the highest form of meditation as empowering, cleansing, and joyful);
CARL BIELEFELDT, DOGEN'S MANUALS OF ZEN MEDITATION 134 (1988) (discussing one

approach to meditation that sees it as the "actualization of complete enlightenment").
I" See, e.g., HULTKRANTZ,supra note 126, at 165; Edward F. Anderson, Pharmacology,
Legal Classification, and the Issue of Substance Abuse, in ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE
TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 107 (Huston Smith & Reuben Snake eds.,
1996) (noting that Native Americans have used peyote for more than one thousand years).
See, e.g., RAYMOND A. BUCKO, THE LAKOTA RITUALOFTHE SWEAT LODGE: HISTORY
AND CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 253 (1998) (referring to the sweat lodge ritual as a "bridge '
141

to the past and suggesting "In crossing this bridge, individuals are better prepared to return
anew to the present world with regenerated strength and optimism.").
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Christians and Muslims use fasting." These transcendental experiences may be
closer to emotions than to thoughts. Many religions convey some notion of this
connection in their description of "ecstasy"'4 or "bliss." 4"
Reason also demands empirical evidence. Some have tried to establish such
evidence for faith. For instance, Descartes tried to apply his logic to prove the
existence of a Christian God.' 49 Inevitably, the attempt was less than fully
successful because beliefs are difficult, if-not impossible, to prove. Therefore,
using a narrow definition of reason, religion seems supra-rational because faith is
not susceptible to empirical or mathematical proof.
Nevertheless, according to a broad definition of rationality, nearly all religions
can claim to be rational in the sense that a reasonable person could believe them to
be true. However, religions vary greatly on the extent to which they rely on reason
as an inherent part of the faith. Many faiths specifically claim to base their faith on
reason. For example Protestants base their faith on'the "Word" that can be read,
interpreted, and followed. 5 ' Evangelical Protestants perceive it to be their job to
spread the Word by persuading others.'"' This endeavor is based on reasoning with
others to teach them the meaning of the Word. Similarly, Roman Catholics believe
that reason is an essential part of their faith, and that personal conscience must be
the final arbiter of sin. 5 2 Muslims also are encouraged to use their own reason in
However,
determining virtue, and the Qur'an uses logic to persuade believers.'
few of these religions would rely on reason alone to support their claims. Thus, it
seems that religion, like many other philosophies, combines rational and nonrational elements.
E. What Problems Arisefrom Treating Religion as Uniquely Supra-Rational?
Courts and commentators treat religion as special under the First Amendment
precisely because it is viewed as non-rational.5 4 Unfortunately, this label carries
146

See ABDULLAH M. KHOUJ, ISLAM: ITS MEANING, OBJECTIVES, AND LEGISLATIVE

SYSTEM 31-35 (1994).
147 See THE MODERN CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 264 (Michael Glazier & Monika K.

Hellwig eds. 1994) (describing ecstasy as "a mystical experience marked by a distinct
consciousness of the Divine Presence"); THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN
SPIRITUALITY 125 (Gordon S. Wakefielded. 1983) (describing ecstasy as"[a] sense of being

taken out of oneself... and united with some higher power").
148 For example, the highest form of meditation in Buddhism is described as a kind ofjoy
or bliss. See, e.g., BERRY, supranote 143, at 155-62.
"9 See DESCARTES, supra note 5.
"0 See THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY 1097-98 (Joseph A. Komonchak et al. eds.,

1987) (referring to the word of God as the written word from the Bible, or the "Word" as
"interior power within the individual" that transcends human words).
' See, e.g., LAROUSSE, supra note 110, at 166; Jackson W. Carroll, A Tale of Two
Seminaries, in 114 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 126-63 (Feb. 1997).
152
'3

See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 128.

See KHOUJ, supranote 146, at 246-48.
See, e.g., United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703,708 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Religious belief
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a stigma. Characterizing religion as inherently supra-rational seems to marginalize
religion in a culture strongly committed to the value of reason. 5' Indeed, the
Western emphasis on reason has a shameful history of labeling unpopular notions
as illogical, irrational, or emotional. 6 Hence, labeling religion as non-rational
raises the risk that religion will be considered not only different from other
philosophies, but also less valuable and therefore less worthy of protection.
It also raises the risk that popular religions will be viewed as more "rational"
while unpopular or rare religions will be viewed as "irrational" or frightening.
Empirical studies have demonstrated that public attitudes about religious freedom
vary with the groups which claim the freedom.' This public preference for the
faith of the majority is reflected in Supreme Court opinions that give preference to
mainstream religions over minority faiths.' For example, American Indians nearly
always lose religion clause cases.' 59 Familiar faiths seem "rational" while less
familiar ones seem "irrational." What is known and understood seems rational, and
individuals who seem like the decision-makers are more easily perceived to be
rational or reasonable. So long as rationality is broadly defined as what a
reasonable person might believe, this problem is inherent in the very definition.
Finally, the distinction between rational and non-rational belief systems fails."
arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his
fellow-men and to his universe."); Austin, supra note 1, at 33; Feofanov, supra note 1, at
385-90.
'55

See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN

LAW AND POLITICS TRIVALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993) (arguing that religion has been

marginalized by the courts).
56 For an excellent discussion of the way reasonableness or rationality have been used
to subordinate outsider groups including women, African-Americans, and Native Americans,
see Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, I ll HARV. L. REV. 445,
456-70 (1997). Justice Scalia has used similar language in his dissent in Romer, where he
disparaged the majority's opinion protecting the rights of homosexuals, accusing the Court
of basing the ruling on "emotive utterance." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996).
'"
JELEN & WILCOX, supra note 50, at 79.
's
See, e.g., Rutherford, Equality, supra note 57, at 1090-91; Dhananjai Shivakumar,
Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1998).

119 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (permitting a state to interfere with Native American sacred ceremonies involving
peyote); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(permitting the federal government to build a road through territory sacred to Native
Americans).; see also Colloquy, The Native American Struggle: Conquering the Rule of

Law, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199 (1993); Jane Rutherford, The Meek Shall
Inherit the Earth: A Power-Based Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions on Religion, 72

DENV. U. L. REV. 909,916 (1995) [hereinafter Rutherford, Meek]; Kristen L. Boyles, Note,
Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117 (1991).
"6 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability ofConscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1256

(1994) ("Religious belief need not be founded in reason, guided by reason, or governed in
anyway by the reasonable."); Fish, Get Along, supra note 13, at 18, 23 ("[R]ationality and
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Rationality requires evidence to establish each proposition, but religion often
supplies such reasons. Consider, for example, the injunction not to steal. Criminal
law tries to deter thieves by threatening them with prosecution and jail. Religious
law tries to deter thieves by threatening them with God's disapproval and hell. Both
systems provide similar reasons for the injunction not to steal:.. if you do, bad things
will happen to you. In both cases the outcome is uncertain. The thief may not be
caught, or if caught may not be convicted, or if convicted may not serve time in jail.
Similarly, God may not exist, or if God exists, God may forgive the thief. In a
religious society, the possibility of eternal damnation may be a more effective
deterrent than criminal prosecution because it is more inevitable. In any event, the
religious law is rational in the sense that it gives reasons and establishes
consequences in much the same way that secular law does. Religion only seems
non-rational because we do not accept the kind of evidence offered to support it.
When a shaman- describes his visions, we are more likely to be skeptical than when
a physicist describes the big bang theory. Yet the shaman is describing an event he
personally has observed and experienced, while the physicist is describing a theory
about the source of the universe that is not yet proven. Nevertheless, one is
considered religion, and the other science. Both religion and non-religion make
arguments supported by contested evidence and resting on unprovable
assumptions.16 ' Both are simultaneously rational and non-rational. Therefore, the
distinction between rational and non-rational approaches cannot justify religious
liberty.
Similarly, the issue is not whether religion and philosophy can be distinguished
as an abstract principle. Even if the two overlap, we have a general idea of what
comprises religion and various techniques are available for resolving any
ambiguities. 62 If there are other philosophies that are so close to religion as to be
indistinguishable, then they too should get First Amendment protection. For
faith go together in an indissoluble package: you can't have one without the other."); Kent
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39

DEPAUL L. REV. 1019, 1029-32 (1990) ("religious convictions as a whole [cannot] be
lumped into a big category called nonrational"); William P. Marshall, Search for Truth,
supra note 92, at 17-18; Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of
Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 71-72 (991) (rejecting binary distinction between

rationality and religion). But see Feofanov, supra note 1,at 385-91 (defining religion as "a
manifestly non-rational (i.e. faith-based) belief concerning the alleged nature of the
universe"); Gey, supra note 94, at 167 ("religious principles are not based on logic or
reason, and, therefore, may not be proved or disproved"); Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the
Religion Clauses, 7 J.

CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES

473, 478 (1996) ("The most basic tenets of

each religion tend to be supported primarily by faith rather than reason, and indeed few
religious claims could be justified by observation and rational argument.").
16' Cf Fish, Mission Impossible, supra note 13, at 2307 (noting that religion, science, and
humanism are equivalent structures resting on their own evidence, texts, goals, and agendas).
62 One method is to employ presumptions. For example, Laurence Tribe has suggested
that we should err on being over-inclusive in our definition of religions for Free Exercise
Clause purposes, but under-inclusive when deciding Establishment Clause cases. See TRIBE,
supra note 112, at 1186.
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example, it is unclear why religious conscientious objectors should be exempt from
military service while secular pacifists are required to serve.' 63 The general
argument against extending the Free Exercise Clause protections to secular rights
of conscience is a risk of anarchy. The fear is that each individual would evaluate
for herself whether it was morally appropriate to follow the law and would assert
the right to "freely exercise" her conscience. The Court has tried to limit such
expanded Free Exercise Clause exemptions by applying rights of conscience only
to philosophies that function in the same way as religions do in an individual's
life.'" Although this approach risks privileging mainstream faiths atthe expense

of more unconventional views, it at least focuses on the relevant question: what
functions do religions perform that justify religious liberty?
IV. A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Religious liberty may be necessary in order to enable religion and religious
institutions to serve important independent societal functions. I can identify at least
four related functions that religion serves: (1) religion helps balance power and
limit the power of both the government and organized faith; (2) religion sometimes
enables disempowered groups to organize and increase their power; (3) religion
produces values that are neither market-driven nor controlled by the government;
and (4) religion provides a source of spirituality and personal identity that enables
individuals to live with purpose and dignity.
A. Religion as a Mechanism to BalancePower

One reason to carve out a special role for religion is to help divide power among
various factions. Religions, like political parties and states, can amass substantial
amounts of power. 65 Any significant concentration of power can become a threat.
The Constitution created a sophisticated structure designed to divide and distribute
power among various contingents. Thus, federalism principles divide power
between the state and federal governments, while separation of power principles
163 See,

e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).

'"
See, e.g., id. at 166 (permitting a conscientious objector exemption when a "given
belief.., occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970) (permitting conscientious
objector status where the belief was held "with the strength of more traditional religious
convictions" (quoting Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081 (1968), rev'd,398 U.S.

333 (1970)).
165"[Cjhurch

and religious groups in the United States have long exerted powerful

political pressures on state and national legislatures, on subjects as diverse as slavery, war,
gambling, drinking, prostitution, marriage, and education." McDaniel v.Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
641 n.25 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 866-67 (1978)); see also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 33-34 (1989) (discussing the long

tradition of churches fostering political change, including abolition, reconstruction, and the
Civil Rights Movement).
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divide power among the three branches of the federal government. The religion
clauses of the First Amendment also disperse power in several different ways. They
divide power so that government cannot combine either with a single faith or with
religion in general (the Establishment Clause); they divide power among several
different faiths (the Free Exercise Clause); and they limit the power the government
can exercise over religions and religious individuals (the Free Exercise Clause).
The religion clauses are constitutionally unique both because they recognize the
importance of limiting private power, and because they acknowledge group as well
as individual rights.
The structure of the religion clauses enables them to regulate two different
kinds of power:"' hierarchical power 167 and cooperative power.16 Hierarchical
power is derived from one's position at the top of a pyramid, and tends to be
coercive. In contrast, cooperative power is derived from one's position in the center
of an interconnected web, and tends to be more cooperative. 69 Hierarchy, by its
very nature creates insiders and outsiders. The insiders are those who either control
the hierarchy or have access to those with control. In contrast, cooperative power
is less likely to generate insiders and outsiders because it arises from connections
between members of the group. The net becomes stronger as more people are
incorporated within it. Everyone can be an insider. Each participant exchanges
information to persuade others to act in concert for a common goal.7 0 While
hierarchical power is exclusive, cooperative power is inclusive. Because several
"sFor discussions of the difference between hierarchical power and cooperative power,
see MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN, AND MORALS 505 (1985);
STEVEN LuKEs, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 28-31 (1974); Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor,
and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1874 (1992); Marion Crain, Images of Powerin Labor
Law: A Feminist Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REV. 481, 491 (1992) [hereinafter Crain,
Images];Angela P. Harris, Forward: The JurisprudenceofReconstruction,82 CAL. L. REV.
741, 773 (1994); Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in
Fact,2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 53 n.66 (1993); Linda K. Kerber, 'A ConstitutionalRight
to be Treated Like.. . Ladies': Women, Civic Obligation, and Military Service, 1993 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 107 n.37 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism andPatriarchy
in the Meaning of Motherhood, I AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 28 (1993); Robin West,
Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,48 (1988).
167

See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 926 (1968) ("In general, we understand

by 'power' the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social
action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.").
168 See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, in 2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 201 (1957),
reprintedin POLITICAL POWER: A READER INTHEORY AND RESEARCH 79,81 (Roderick Bell

et al. eds., 1969) ('A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that
B would not otherwise do."). For descriptions of the pluralist approach to political power,
see Nelson W. Polsby, How to Study Community Power: The PluralistAlternative, 22 J.
POL. 474 (1960), reprintedin POLITICAL POWER: A READER INTHEORY AND RESEARCH,
supra, at 31.
"6 Crain, Images, supra note 166, at 511. For a fuller development of these contrasting
views, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); see also Rutherford, Meek, supranote 159, at 913.
170

See DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES, AND USES 21 (1979).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:2

webs can be joined, many individuals may share power in complex ways.
Sometimes individuals possess both kinds of power simultaneously. The
distinctions I have suggested between hierarchical power and cooperative power
may be somewhat overstated because hierarchical power can be used to acquire
cooperative power and vice versa."" For example, organizational skills (a form of
cooperative power) can be used to generate funding (a source of hierarchical
power). Capital then can be used to purchase the cooperative skills of an organizer.
Power begets power in all its forms.
These models of hierarchical and cooperative power help explain the
relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The
Establishment Clause limits the cooperative power generated when government
joins forces with religion, while the Free Exercise Clause limits the hierarchical
power the government may exercise over religion.
1. The Establishment Clause as a Mechanism to Balance Power
If the goal is to limit power concentrations, then the greatest threat comes when
government allies itself with coalitions of organized religions. Government power
is strong not only because it is hierarchical, but also because it has a monopoly on
the legitimate use of force."7 Although the source of religious power varies with
how hierarchal or cooperative the church polity is, most religions claim heightened
moral authority. Thus, the Court has praised religious positions for their moral
qualities, 73 and cited religious sources to bolster moral claims. 74 In contrast, the
Court has tended to view other identity-based groups as less legitimate special
interests. Hence, attempts to organize politically around common issues that face
racial groups have consistently been invalidated.'
The consequence is to give religious groups disproportionate power in setting
the cultural and political agenda. This increased power is especially troubling
...Rutherford, Meek, supra note 159, at 914.
1' See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986)
(characterizingjudges' legal interpretations as imposing violence on others); see alsoOwen
M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 741 (1982) ("All law is
masked power.").
'7
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-24 (1972) ("[M]embers [of the
Amish community] are productive and very law-abiding members of society.. ").
174 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651-52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(mentioning "the holy estate of matrimony" as further support for his moral argument against
homosexual sodomy) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (supporting his argument
against homosexual sodomy with references to Judeo-Christian morals); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1878) (noting that the practice of polygamy was prosecuted by
the ecclesiastical courts).
15 See generally Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (invalidating racially conscious
redistricting); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (same); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993) (same); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating
racial set-asides in government contracts).

20011

RELIGION, RATIONALITY, AND SPECIAL TREATMENT

because leaders who shape religious views have a form of political power as well.
This dual power reflects the fact that religion and politics are overlapping spheres.
Religions are affected by the values of the polity. 76 Similarly, the political
community is influenced by the values of the religious communities. Indeed, one
way to view religions is to see them as intermediary political institutions that enable
their members to organize for political change in favor of their shared moral
views."' That is quite close to James Madison's view of religions as factions."'
Religions are conduits for communication between individuals and the state." 9 De
Tocqueville recognized this role when he described American religion as "the first
of their political institutions."' 8 °
When coalitions of religions form around an issue such as abortion, the
hierarchical power of one faith (i.e., Roman Catholics) may be added to the
cooperative power of another (i.e., Southern Baptists). When such potent coalitions
unite with the hierarchical power of government, power is extremely concentrated.
So long as these coalitions are perceived as only influencing or persuading
government of the wisdom of their proposals, it seems inappropriate to interfere.
At some point, however, government risks being captured by these religious
coalitions. Occasionally judges have suggested that these cooperative ventures
between religion and the state have crossed the line. For example, Justice Stevens
has argued that enforcement of abortion limits are an unconstitutional establishment
of religion,'8 ' and Judge Posner has suggested that Connecticut's ban on
contraceptives was motivated solely by the sectarian interests of the Roman
Catholic Church.'82 Such arguments are difficult for pragmatic reasons. First, these
religious coalitions are very appealing to those who agree with the values advanced.
76

Barbara B. Zikmund, Winning Ordination for Women in Mainstream Protestant

Churches, in 3 WOMEN AND RELIGION, supra note 12, at 339, 347 ("In 1920, the women's
suffrage amendment was ratified and women became voting citizens. Church women began
to wonder, [i]f women can go to the polls to vote for the [PIresident and [C]ongress, why
can't we vote and serve as leaders in our churches?").
"' See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (noting that the
Jaycees, like some churches, have a right of expressive association to help preserve cultural
and political diversity); see also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 248 (1988) ("Religion ...is a form of social life that
mobilizes the deepest passions of believers in the course of creating institutions that stand
between individuals and the state.").
78 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
79 See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES 50-51 (1990).
"8' ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 153 (George Lawrence trans., 2d

ed. 1990).
"8'Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566-67 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting). But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (holding
that "the fact that the funding restrictions [on abortions may] coincide with the religious
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, contravene the Establishment
Clause").
182

RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON

327 (1992).
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For instance, few would criticize organized religion for forming coalitions to
support abolition. However, those who disagree with coalition positions on other
issues like abortion often think the power is abused. Second, to oppose coalition
power seems to be anti-democratic. Organizing around common issues is precisely
what good citizens are supposed to do.
The real problem is when government lends its hierarchical power to religion.
Then the Establishment Clause should be strictly enforced.' 83 Sometimes, as in
BoardofEducation of Kiryas Joel Village School Districtv. Grumet, the religion
takes control of a political subdivision of the state (in that instance a school
district)." More frequently, however, combined power is used to fund religious
enterprises. "5 The government has enormous taxing power, so it wields a great deal
of economic power. If it lends that power in the form of subsidies to religious
entities, large concentrations of power can result.
Increasingly, the Supreme Court dismisses Establishment Clause concerns when
the subsidy is provided to religion in general or to all religions equally.'86 However,
from a power-based perspective, government financing of a broad coalition of
religious groups may concentrate financial power even more than individual
subsidies.'87 This reasoning suggests that the Court erred in Rosenberger. There,
the Commonwealth of Virginia combined its taxing power with the persuasive
power of the most pervasive religion in the region. 8 The Court required a state
See H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be PeacefulCoexistence
of Religion with the Secular State? 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203,208-09 (1999) (arguing that the
Supreme Court enforces the Establishment Clause more strictly than the Free Exercise
Clause); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, andthe Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 332 n. 14, 334
(1985) (arguing that we should strictly enforce establishment clause violations); Laurence
H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward A Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1,21-25 (1973) (arguing that the entanglement between church and state
should be strictly prohibited).
184 512 U.S. 687, 692-95, 702 n.6, 706-07 (1994) (plurality opinion). For a more
nuanced
discussion of KiryasJoel that considers the Establishment Clause in terms of the balance of
power, see Rutherford, Meek, supra note 159, at 921-25.
3

185

See supra note 96 and cases cited therein.

See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(requiring equal funding to secular student publications and a Christian student publication);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (requiring
equal access to school property when it is not in use for school purposes for secular groups
and an evangelical church group showing a six-part film series).
187 For a description of the power wielded by such coalitions, see Marci A. Hamilton,
Power, The Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 818-19 (1999)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Power].
188 Religions called "Evangelical"
are comprised of five religious sects including
Pentecostals, Anabaptists, Reformed and Independent Fundamentalists, and Baptists. See
16

BARRY A. KOsMIN & SEYMOUR K. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 295 (1993). In Virginia, 31.2% of the population are

Baptists. In three southern states, Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi, Baptists alone
comprise over 50% of the population. In Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
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university to use its hierarchical power to force students who did not share the
religious perspective of a Christian group to pay to publish the avowedly Christian
texts. Objecting students possessed relatively little cooperative power compared to
the well-organized Christian group. As a diffused population with no common
cohesive group, the objectors would find it difficult to organize. Consequently,
objecting students had little cooperative power, and virtually no hierarchical power.
In contrast, the Christian group wielded significant cooperative power which they
were able to augment with the substantial hierarchical power of the state. That
combined power largely isolated non-Christian and secularist students as powerless
outsiders at the university.
Government subsidies increase the power of groups that can accumulate
substantial cooperative power because cohesive groups can organize efficiently.' 89
These groups can use techniques like bloc voting to increase their power and
acquire more benefits. More diffused groups, however, are less likely to organize
and so they are less likely to vote as a bloc or obtain the subsidy. As a result,
government subsidies may tend to marginalize less organized groups like secular
individuals. Often, religious groups are more cohesive than larger, isolated, and
more disorganized groups of individuals defined by race, gender, disability, or
secular views. Thus, religious entities may have more cooperative power that
should not be enlarged with government subsidies. My critique of Rosenberger
illustrates the first principle derived from balancing power in the religion clauses:
that the combined power of church and state poses the greatest danger, and should
therefore be the most strictly limited. Accordingly, compliance with the
Establishment Clause is a compelling state interest that may justify some intrusions
on other liberties like free speech.
But the discussion so far has ducked the original question: what makes religion
special? Shouldn't we worry just as much about subsidies for strong secular
groups? Won't such subsidies also concentrate power? Of course, we should be
concerned about such concentrations of power. Madison and the Founders were
right about limiting the power of religion to co-opt government, but they were less
prescient about the other powerful organizations. Hence, we now find ourselves
struggling with legislative attempts to limit power such as campaign financing
rules 9 . or antitrust laws. 9 ' History teaches us that religious groups have often tried

West Virginia, Baptists, representing more than 29% ofthe population, are the single largest
denomination in each state. See id. at 88-99 (the other five religions are present in those
states, but not insignificant numbers. The United States Census cites this as one of the two
sources from which itreceives data on religions and religious affiliation); see also MARTIN
B. BRADLEY ET. AL., CHURCHES AND CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 1990, at

7-9 (1992).
189

See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,

718-28 (1985) (discussing principles of political organization and the strength that comes
with small, cohesive groups).
'90 See,

e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Buckley v. Am.

Constitutional Law Found. Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political
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to co-opt government power and have triggered violent uprisings in an attempt to
garner more power.'9 2 The religion clauses have served us relatively well in
avoiding such concentrations of power. The fact that we may also need to cabin
power in the secular sector does not mean we should abandon the Establishment
Clause.
2. The Free Exercise Clause as a Mechanism to Balance Power
If one goal of the religion clauses is to divide power, then the tension between
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause makes sense. Because both
governments and religions can be powerful, we need both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause prevents government from
combining power with organized religion.' 93 The Free Exercise Clause disperses
power in three ways: (1) it increases the power of individuals to follow their own
consciences; (2) it limits the power of government to intrude in religious matters;
and (3) it limits the power of the church by encouraging religious pluralism.
Religion increases the power of personal conscience. When individuals act on
personal religious convictions, they are less likely to upset the balance of power.
Harmless individual religious conduct does not pose a threat of abusive hierarchical
or cooperative power. Accordingly, we should grant the broadest possible freedom
to individual Free Exercise Clause exemptions and we should not be overly
concerned about narrow definitions of religion. Permitting broad Free Exercise
Clause exemptions helps to diffuse power and favors privatized religion.
For example, when Smith used peyote in a sacrament of the Native American
Church, he did not combine religious power with government power, nor did he use
the organizational structure of the church to garner increased cooperative power to
further a political or cultural agenda. On the contrary, the fact that religious peyote
use was subject to criminal sanctions is evidence of how little power the Native
American Church had. Making such relatively harmless religious conduct subject
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
' ' See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27

(1994).
" Religious insurrections have been occurring for centuries in various parts ofthe world.
See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 48, at 29-32, 39-55, 63-70 ("The essence of the core half

century of revolution-the 1640-1690 years encompassing the English Civil War and its
consolidating sequel of 1688-was to uphold Parliament and Protestantism... ."); Ronald
A. Christaldi, The Shamrock and the Crown: A Historic Analysis of the Framework
Document and Prospectsfor Peace in Ireland,5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 123, 125-130

(1995) ("The greatest obstacle to peace in Ireland is the intolerance that Catholics and
Protestants have for one another."); Barry A. Fisher, The Bosnia War: Religion,History &
the Gypsies, 17 WHIMIIER L. REV. 467, 468-472 (1996) (documenting the long history of
religious conflict in the former Yugoslavia).
' See, e.g., Hamilton, Power,supra note 187, at 814; Marci A. Hamilton, A Reply, 31
CoNN. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1999); William P. Marshall, The Inequality of AntiEstablishment, 1993 BYU L. REV. 63, 68-71; Rutherford, Equality,supra note 57, at 106263; Rutherford, Meek, supra note 159, at 914-15.
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to "neutral laws of general applicability"'9 4 divests -Smith and other religious
individuals of the right to ask courts to see that society accommodates the free
exercise of religion. The only protections or accommodations must come from
legislatures. Thus,cages like Smith 95 and Boerne'96 encourage organized faiths to
combine their cooperative power with the hierarchical power of legislatures to
protect their religious practices. Popular faiths are more likely to be able to
convince legislatures to grant accommodations. Once strong lobbying machinery
is organized, it is likely to be used for broader purposes than protecting harmless
religious rituals. Thus, allowing individuals to claim Free Exercise Clause
exemptions increases individual liberty, diminishes the incentive for religions to
concentrate their power, and avoids legislative religious favoritism.
Unfortunately, favoritism is not necessarily limited to legislatures. Courtenforced Free Exercise Clause exemptions merely may substitute the hierarchical
power of courts for the hierarchal power of legislatures. While private interest
groups often manipulate legislatures, courts structurally privilege wealthier
parties. 97 Although courts seem relatively unresponsive to the plight of outsider
faiths, in a few instances, notably those involving Jehovah's Witnesses, the courts
have preserved Free Exercise Clause freedoms.' 98
Strong Free Exercise Clause exemptions serve another purpose as well. They

'9
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Of course, whether the use of peyote is harmless is itself a
debatable proposition. In her concurrence in Smith, Justice O'Connor argued that the state
had a compelling state interest to regulate peyote use because of the dangerous nature of the
drug. See id The majority, however, rejected that theory and held that the state had the right
to impose any neutral law of general application regardless of the extent of harm involved.
See id. at 878-82.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
117 See, e.g., Bliss Cartwright et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning
and
Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970,21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 403,437-38 n.3 (1987)
(reporting on a one hundred-year sample of cases that revealed that those with financial
resources faired better than those without); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 114-24
(1974) (documenting how wealthier parties are able to translate their privilege into litigation
victories not only with high priced attorneys but also as repeat players in the system);
Rutherford, Myth, supra note 20, at 41 (noting that courts purport to consider the relative
power of the parties, but in practice the balance is in favor of the powerful); James L.
Ahlstrom, Note, McKnight v. Rees: Delineating the Qualified Immunity "Haves" and
"Have-nots" Among Private Parties,1997 BYU L. REV. 335-421 n.2.
198 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (reversing the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness for distributing religious literature); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943) (invalidating an ordinance making it a crime for a solicitor to knock on residents'
doors); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a
requirement that a student recite the Pledge of Allegiance when it conflicted with their
religious beliefs); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating ordinances
forbidding the distribution of leaflets).
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foster religious pluralism,'99 which limits the power of any single religion to
monopolize either the political or the cultural landscape. In essence, Free Exercise
Clause exemptions enable religious dissidents to engage in their own religious
practices without convincing either established church authorities or the government
of the wisdom or legitimacy of their views. In the absence of Free Exercise Clause
rights, the powerful faiths would wield both political and cultural control of the
2
public debates on morality. Such religious pluralism also encourages tolerance. "
When no one religion controls the political and cultural landscape, self-interest
encourages religious tolerance.
Balancing power, however, is not the only function of the religion clauses. If
power concentrations were the only issue, then we would subsidize weak religions
and tax stronger ones. Similarly, we would subsidize weak political groups and tax
strong ones. Under this approach, Republicans and Catholics might be denied
funding as well-organized, wealthy, and relatively powerful groups, while Nazis and
Baha'is might receive funding because they are small and relatively powerless.
Although balancing power is one function of the religion clauses, it is not the only
one. The religion clauses serve other purposes as well.
B. Religion as a Mouthpiecefor Disempowered Voices
Access to intermediate organizations like religious congregations is particularly
important for minorities, women, immigrants, and the disabled groups that tend to
have less political power than their numbers would suggest.2"' Religion has had

199 See SMITH, FAILURE, supra note 74, at 42 ("the American experience generally,
[represents an experience] in which a commitment to broader religious freedom has evolved
of necessity out of the fact of religious pluralism"); Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder
to Yoda: Models of Traditional,Modern, and PostmodernReligion in US. Constitutional
Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 70 (1999) ("each church contributes to the pluralism of our
society through its purely religious activities, but the state encourages these activities not
because it champions religion per se but because it values religion among a variety of
private, non-profit enterprises that contribute to the diversity of the Nation" (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S.252 (1982)); McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 63, at 710-12
(arguing that within the constitutional framework "a government committed to religious
pluralism should be entitled to recognize and accommodate the religious interest" ); Mark
Tushnet, The EmergingPrincipleofAccommodation of Religion (Dubiante),76 GEO. L.J.
1691, 1699-1701 (1988) (arguing that Madison expressly intended both political and
religious pluralism which therefore mandates accommodation of religious beliefs); cf
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 381-83 (1989-90) (arguing that religious
pluralism limits the power of religions to control politics and culture, but that does not
warrant free exercise exemptions for religion alone).
o See, e.g., George Dargo, Religious Tolerationand its Limits in Early America, 16 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1996); J. Paul Martin, Christianityand Islam: Lessonsfrom
Africa, 1998 BYU L. REV. 401, 402 (1998); Richard S. Myers, The Establishment Clause
andNativity Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v. Donnelly, 77 KY. L.J. 61, 83-84 (1989).
"'1 In 1999, the United States Senate had 2 Asian or Pacific Islanders, I American Indian,
9 women, and no African-Americans. Similarly, only 39 of the 534 representatives were
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mixed success in providing access for the relatively disempowered. Several
African-American leaders like Dr. Martin Luther King and. Jesse Jackson first
gained access to the public as religious leaders. However, many are excluded from
°2
access within their -religions because of their gender, race, disability, or age..
Nevertheless, religion may provide the opportunity for the relatively,powerless
to get their agenda expressed in the policy debates. American religion has a long
history ofembracing the downtrodden and articulating their demands. For example,
the abolitionist movement was closely tied to religious groups like the Methodists
and the Quakers.20 3 Similarly, African-Americans have found their churches to
provide personal empowerment, hope, social services, and stability in the face of
widespread societal discrimination. 4 The Catholic Church provided many of the
same services for waves of immigrants. 0 5
Once again, however, the relationship between religions and outsider groups
black, 19 were Hispanic, 5 were Asian or Pacific Islanders, and 58 were women. See Charles
Pope, New Congress is Older, More Politically Seasoned, 57 CQ WEEKLY 60, 62 (1999).
Note that these figures do not include delegates, and there was one vacancy, which is why
the total number of representatives was 534 and not 535. Id at 60. In 1993, the United States.
Senate had only I African-American senator and 6 women senators. Similarly, only 8.7%
of the representatives were black and 10.8% were women. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 277 tbl. 443 (113th
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC

ed. 1993).; see also STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 207-08 (1974).

202 See, e.g., Rutherford, Equality, supra note 57 at 1056-59, 1087-88 and the cases cited
therein.
203 See, e.g., SAMUEL G. FREEDMAN, UPON THIS ROCK: THE MIRACLES OF A BLACK
CHURCH (1993) (discussing the plight of a black church in Brooklyn, New York as it
struggles to deal with the social issues and ills that plague black communities by
implementing various outreach ministries to deal with poverty, homelessness,
disenchantment, violence, crime, and teen pregnancy); RALPH E. LUKER, THE SOCIAL
GOSPEL INBLACK AND WHITE: AMERICAN RACIAL REFORM, 1885-1912 11 (1991).
204 See, e.g., CATHY J. COHEN, THE BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS:
AIDS AND THE

BREAKDOWN OF BLACK POLITICS 276-77 (1999) (citing sociological studies showing the

importance of the black church in the lives of African-Americans). See generally
FREEDMAN, supra note 203.
205

Archdiocese of New York, Archdiocese ofNew York: Catholic Charities: Immigrant

and Refugee Services, at http://www.ny-archdiocese.org/charities/immigr.cfm (office
dedicated to helping immigrants and refugees) (visited July 17, 1999); Catholic CharitiesArchdiocese of Boston, Our History: Providing Hope for All Since 1903, at
http://www.ccab.org/History.cfin (history of Catholic Services, including services for
immigrants during the early twentieth century, in Boston) (visited July 17, 1999); Catholic
Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco, Citizenship, Refugee and Immigration

Services at http://www.ccasf.org/cris.htm (noting that for the last twenty years, Catholic
Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco has been providing services for immigrants)
(visited July 17, 1999); Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., Catholic
Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc.: History at http://www.catholiccharitiesadm.
org/history.htm (noting that the agency started during the Great Depression helping

immigrants fight deportation) (visited July 17, 1999).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:2

has been mixed. For example, religion was used to both attack and support
slavery.2"' Similarly, While some religions championed the causes ofcivil rights for
minorities,2" 7 others consciously expounded racist doctrines such as labeling
African-Americans as cursed with the mark of Cain;2 . prohibiting interracial dating
based on the biblical story of the Tower of Babel;" issuing commandments to
"destroy all Jewish thought and influence;"21 defending segregation on religious
grounds;"' adopting slogans calling for a racial holy war;2 12 or instigating "that
white people are the true Israelites," and denigrating blacks and Jews. 2 3 Some of
the very churches that supported abolition resisted the attempts of AfricanAmericans to control their own congregations or church property. 2t" Historically,
206

See generally MARGARET WASHINGTON CREEL, "A PECULIAR PEOPLE:" SLAVE

RELIGION AND COMMUNITY-CULTURE AMONGTHE GULLAHS 74 (1988) (discussing religion
in relation to the slavery system); WILLS, supra note 48, at 195-206 (discussing slave

owners' fear of introducing Christianity to slaves and the use of Christianity by
African-Americans in their struggles for equality); FORREST G. WOOD, THE ARROGANCE OF
FAITH: CHRISTIANITY AND RACE IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY (1990) (arguing that fundamentalist Christians used scripture to support the
institution of slavery).
207 See generally JAMES F. FINDLAY, JR., CHURCH PEOPLE IN THE STRUGGLE:
THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT, 1950-1970
(1993) (discussing the Protestant movement for civil rights); THE QUIETVOICES: SOUTHERN
RABBIS AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS, 1880S TO 1990S (Mark K. Bauman & Berkley Kalin eds.,

1997) (discussing Jewish support for civil rights).
208

BRUCE R. MCCONKIE, MORMON DOCTRINE 107,476-77,554 (1958) (official Mormon

text describing "the negro race" as cursed by the mark of their ancestor Cain with dark skin);
see also Robert J. Morris, "What Though Our Rights Have Been Assailed?" Mormons,
Politics, Same-Sex Marriage, and Cultural Abuse in the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), 18
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129, 181-82 (1997) (nineteenth century origins ofthe Mormon belief
in the mark of Cain); Larry B. Stammer, Mormons May Disavow Old View on Blacks, L. A.
TIMES, May 18, 1998, at A2 (discussing possible change in Mormon doctrine to state that
blacks are not cursed with dark skin); Larry B. Stammer, Mormon Plan to Disavow Racist
Teaching Jeopardized by Publicity, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1998, at A13 (quoting
spokesperson for Mormon Church as saying that a change in doctrine is not needed because
blacks can become priests); Larry B. Stammer, Religion; Mormon Leader Defends Race
Relations; Interview: Gordon B.Hinckley Says Church Does Not Need to Further Disavow
its Former Teachings that Blacks are Cursed by God, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at B4
(quoting the President of Mormon Church as saying that a change in doctrine is not needed
because blacks are treated well within the church).
209 See William H. Hohan, Bob Jones Jr., 86, Leader ofFundamentalistCollege, Dies,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at B7.
210 John Cloud et al., Is Hate on the Rise; Racist Groups May Not Be Growing, but
They're Finding Deadlier Recruits, TIME, July 19, 1999, at 33.
21 Charlotte Elizabeth Parsons, Comment, Doing Justice and Loving Kindness: A
Comment on Hostile Environments and the Religious Employee, 19 U.ARK. LrIrLEROCK
L. REV. 643, 656 n.83 (1996).
222 Pam Belluck, Hate Groups Seeking Broader Reach, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1999, at A 16.
213 Parsons, supra note 211, at 656.
24 As one nineteenth-century African-American Methodist minister explained:
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some faiths have also branded the mentally ill as possessed by demons or controlled
by Satan,215 while many religions have embraced views that subordinate women
both within the faith and the community." 6 This mixed history suggests that
religions may not be the best vehicle for advancing the cause of outsider groups.
Other organizations such as the NAACP or NOW may have been more effective as
a voice for those who feel excluded. Religion, however, often provides an
underpinning of moral legitimacy to these claims.
C. Religion as a Source of Moral Values
Religion is more than just an organized faction that can balance power in the
polity, however. It also is a source for substantive values in the community.
Accordingly, some of the Founders, civic republicans in particular, thought that
religion could supply the public virtue necessary to govern a republic." 7 Of course,
other sources for values exist, but religion may stress values that get displaced in
a market-driven economy and self-interested polity."' Specifically, religion often
offers communitarian values that emphasize spirituality, nurturing, and social
justice in contrast to the market values that tend to be individual, selfish, and
The conference (as I have understood) have said repeatedly, that the coloured
societies was nothing but an unprofitable trouble; and yet, when the society of
Bethel Church unanimously requested to go free, it was not granted, until the
supreme court of [Pennsylvania] said, it should be so. But again, it will be
asked, who could stop them, if they were determined to go. None-Provided
they had left their church property behind; to purchase which, perhaps many of
them had deprived their children of bread.
Sermon delivered in the African Bethel Church in Baltimore (Jan. 21, 1816), in I A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (Herbert
Aptheker ed., 1990); see also KATHERINE L. DVORAK, AN AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXODUS:

THE SEGREGATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHURCHES 140 (199 1) (noting the debates among the
Methodists about who would own church property); FORREST G. WOOD, THE ARROGANCE
OF FAITH:

CHRISTIANITY AND RACE IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE

TWENTIETH CENTURY 316 (1990) (noting that in 1874 in Atlanta, when a Methodist church
official ordered blacks to be able to use church facilities that they had been denied
previously, the white members of the church left and set up their own church).
25 See Lois G. Forer, Law and the Unreliable Person, 36 EMORY L.J. 181, 186-87

(1987); Mark C. Siegel, LethalPity: The Oregon Deathwith DignityAct, Its Implications
for the Disabled,and the Strugglefor Equality in an Able-Bodied World, 16 LAW & INEQ.
259 (1998).
26 Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
BicentennialPerspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453 (1992).
217 See, e.g., DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 180, at 150; Timothy L. Hall, Religion and
Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REV. 87 (1992) (arguing for a
robust concept of religious liberty based on its role in nurturing civic virtue).
218 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS & THE INTERESTS: POLITICALARGUMENTS FOR
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 10 (20th Anniversary ed. 1997); Deborah Waire Post,
Profit, Progress and Moral Imperatives, 9 TOuRo L. REV. 487 (1993) (reviewing MEIR
TAMKI, INTHE MARKETPLACE: JEWISH BUSINESS ETHICS (1991)).
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materialistic. Unfortunately, religious values also may include intolerance, sexual
repression, hierarchy, submissiveness, and sacrifice of the powerless. Indeed, the
question of whether the values espoused by any particular religion constitute

"virtues" is inherently subjective. Nevertheless, religion provides an alternative

basis for value formation beyond personal gain and efficiency.
The values many religions propound often get translated into valuable services
provided to the community. Hence, religion plays a practical communal role by
providing the social services that government depends upon. For instance, religious
groups provide care for the elderly, adoption services, foster home placements, and
orphanages under government contracts."1 9 Therefore, religion is important as a
community organization, both as a source of values and as a source of services.
D. Religion as a Source of Spirituality and Dignity
For some, religion offers moral authority, peace, community, and most
importantly, spiritually transformative experiences.22 Legal rules often trivialize
the importance of spirituality. In doing so, law inflicts deep and unnecessary pain,
and undervalues the peculiar pleasures of belonging to a community of faith. Once
again, Smith serves as a helpful example. The Court applied a version of equality
theory that treats members of the Native American Church as if they were the same
as recreational drug users even though the two groups are starkly different. To
equate the two is to miss the religious significance of an experience that provides
both vision and a sense of community. Peyote-induced hallucinations are
influenced both by personality and by culture so that religious belief alters the way
the visions occur and are perceived. 2 ' When a member of the Native American
Church is prohibited from using peyote, he loses not only the physical experiences
and visions, but also the "religious ecstacy"222 or "rapture."223 This hedonic loss is
not trivial. It goes to the very essence of what defines an individual and his
community.
Laws that intrude on religious practices often cause a deep wound because they
rob individuals of their very sense of themselves. Religion, or its absence, helps
form us both as children and adults, providing a crucial source of identity. 224 It
defines us, both as individuals and as members or non-members of groups. For
some, religion provides a community of shared values, concerns, and culture that
serves as an anchor in a fragmented society. Hence, government intrusions on the
See, e.g., Catholic Charities USA, What Local CharitiesDo, at http://www.catholic
charitiesusa.org/who/charities.htmi (demonstrating that these services and others are
provided by local offices of Catholic Charities USA) (visited July 16, 1999).
220 See id
2' See HULTKRANTZ, supra note 126, at 28.
222 Id. at 27.
223 Id. at 28.
224 See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the EstablishmentClause,
82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1115, 1164-65 (1988); Garvey, Free Exercise, supra note 125, at 789;
Lupu, supra note 133, at 357, 383; Marshall, Ideas, supra note 92, at 396; Rutherford,
Equality, supra note 57, at 1091.
2"9
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free exercise of religion may seem like personal attacks and may be viewed as a
form of persecution. Those affected may be viewed as martyrs, while the
government may be seen as exercising raw power rather than legitimate authority.
The old "compelling state interest" test acknowledged these harms and required the
government to provide a justification for any intrusions. Although almost any
excuse seemed to be found sufficiently compelling, the. standard at least nominally
recognized the importance of religious practices. The current rules of neutrality
hide the harms imposed on religious individuals. Consequently, even if the
substantive results are the same (nearly all government regulations are held to be
impervious to religious exemptions), the new rule seems to diminish the respect for
religious observance.
Thus, in construing the religion clauses, we should focus on religion as a
mechanism to balance power, a source for values, a channel for outsider voices, and
a source of individual spirituality and dignity. This functionalist approach to the
religion clauses avoids the need to distinguish religion from philosophy. To the
extent that philosophy fulfills these functions, it should be treated as a religion. To
the extent its functions differ, then it should not be treated as a religion. Typically,
most philosophies will not be key players in the balance of power or channels for
dissident voices, but to the extent that other philosophies perform these functions,
there is no principled reason to exclude them from both the protections and limits
of the religion clauses. Religion is entitled to special protections and limits in the
constitutional scheme, not because it is rational or non-rational, but because it plays
special roles.
V. THE SCOPE OF RELIGIOUS LIBER Y

A functional approach to religion not only distinguishes it from non-religion,
but also establishes the scope of religious liberty. Religious freedom, like all other
liberties, is not absolute. The limits on free exercise or establishment should reflect
the underlying purposes of the religion clauses.
A. The Scope of Religious Liberty Necessary to Balance Power
I have argued that the religion clauses are part of the general constitutional
scheme to balance and limit power. Specifically, the Establishment Clause limits
combinations of government and religious power. Thus, for Establishment Clause
purposes, government subsidies of religion are very troubling. Because the
Establishment Clause focuses on aggregated power, general subsidies or tax breaks
for all religions are troubling, even when they do not favor any particular sect.
The Free Exercise Clause, in contrast, is designed to protect both individuals
and religious groups from state persecution. Functionally, it does not matter
whether the state intended to persecute the individuals or not. Religious individuals
need to be able to enforce exceptions to generally applicable rules whenever the
rules unnecessarily impinge on relatively harmless religious practices. Courtenforced Free Exercise Clause exemptions are necessary to protect religious
outsiders from unaware or hostile legislatures.
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Faced with its own view of religion as inherently non-rational, the Court has
been reluctant to grant Free Exercise Clause exemptions. To permit such
exceptions seems especially problematic if religion cannot be narrowly defined.
Broadly defined religious exemptions seem to risk anarchy where each individual
decides for herself whether to follow the law. Anarchy is unlikely, however, if the
Establishment Clause also is strictly enforced. Then claiming religious status
permits Free Exercise Clause exceptions, but excludes the claimant from
government funding opportunities. The Establishment Clause prohibition on
government funding is the price religion must pay for the Free Exercise Clause.22
That approach is consistent with the need to balance power.
When religions claim the right to state support in the form of tax breaks226 and

22

Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the

Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 672, 678 (1992) (stating that "free exercise in the

broad sense took something of a battering [during the 1940s] from Court majorities who
gave a very expansive interpretation to the notion of 'establishment' without pausing to
consider the costs they might be inflicting on the associational aspects of free exercise");
McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 51, at 135 (stating that the "improvements [by
the Rehnquist Court] on establishment issues have come at a heavy price: the radical
reduction of free exercise rights"); Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Where is the Supreme Court Heading?, 32 CATH. LAW. 187,200(1989)

(commenting that because of the conflict between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause, the only way that poor people can send their children to religious schools
is to not receive remedial education: "a heavy price to pay"); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 369, 371 n.66 (1986) (stating that the "Third

Circuit opinion [Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984)] is
perhaps the harshest example of Establishment Clause analysis gone awry-promotion of
'separation' even at the cost of the obvious denial of equal protection of the free speech of
religious students because of the content of their speech"; also stating that the "strict
neutrality" approach, [as stated in PHILIP B. KURLAND,

RELIGION AND THE

LAW (1962)],

"while purporting to apply a neutral principle of equality of treatment to both clauses, in
effect favors the anti-establishment prohibition 'at a cost of almost total emasculation of the
free exercise provision"' (quoting Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A
Consistent Understanding ofReligion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805,
808 (1978)); Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal

Rights andCivic Virtues, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 18 (1997) (commenting that "the emphasis
on neutrality in the religion cases has led to an over-emphasis on the worry about
establishment, even at a cost to accommodation of free exercise"); Daniel Parish, Comment,
Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 253,276 (1994) ("The wider

interpretation of the reasonable observer ... admittedly protects Establishment Clause
interests at some cost to free exercise.").
226 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 105 (1994) (permitting tax exemptions forparsonages forministers);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (permitting tax deductions for tuition to religious
schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 696-97 (1970) (holding
that tax deductions for contributions to religious institutions were neutral because they did
not discriminate among religions).
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financial subsidies... but reject any government regulations, they seem to be reaping
the benefits without paying the cost. The result is to increase the inevitable
conflicts between government and faith. This scenario is currently being played out
in a burgeoning series of cases about zoning and land use. 228 Because church
property is not subject to taxes, zoning boards are increasingly reluctant to approve
petitions for new churches or expansions of old ones. If religious institutions paid
their fair share of the local taxes, municipalities and zoning boards might be much
more welcoming. When religions are seen as free riders that demand municipal
services without shouldering their share of the cost, they generate more community
hostility.
Because every individual or organization that serves the functions would have
the choice of whether to be treated as a religion or a secular organization, most of
the concerns about neutrality would disappear. One remaining concern might be
that politically powerful faiths would not need Free Exercise Clause protections
because they could mold the law in their favor. Hence, they might be tempted to
declare themselves as secular to qualify for government largesse. In contrast, small
and powerless faiths could not wield enough influence to protect their practices and
would be frozen out of government support. It is hard to imagine powerful churches
like the Roman Catholics announcing their secular status. Indeed, much of their
self-image and their moral authority comes from their self-identified religious
nature. Hence, fear of larger religions squeezing out the smaller ones by declaring
themselves secular seems unlikely.
A more likely scenario, however, is that these new rules might increase the
power of large, strong secular groups. In essence, that was the argument of the
Christian students in Rosenberger. If they had been feminists, they could have
received state funding for pro-choice activities, but because they identified
themselves as Christian, they were disqualified from state funding for anti-choice
positions. The problem illustrates how difficult it is to evaluate who wields the
most power in any given context. At the national level, the Religious Right
substantially shapes the political agenda, but it is less clear how much power the
Christian student group had at the University of Virginia. If unequal funding is
their chief concern, however, they would be free under my approach to simply
rename themselves Students Against Choice and get the same funds available to the
feminists. What they would lose would be the right to claim superior moral
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (rejecting a Free Exercise
Clause challenge to landmark limits on church property); Mount Elliot Cemetery Ass'n v.
City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a zoning ordinance did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause when the city refused to rezone property for use as a Catholic
cemetery); First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier County, Fla., 20 F.3d 419
(1 Ith Cir. 1994) (holding the zoning ordinances were neutral and so enforcing them did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause); Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that zoning ordinance did not violate
church's right to free exercise); Rector, Wardens, and Members of Vestry of St.
Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
landmark laws are not an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion).
227
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authority for their position and their right to exclude non-Christian, anti-choice
students. Those limits would merely help even the odds in the marketplace of ideas.
Religions might well ask themselves which limits their religious liberty more:
paying for their activities themselves, but then remaining free of most regulations
on their activities, or accepting tax breaks and subsidies that then render them
subject to pervasive government regulation. The answer may vary with the wealth
of the religious institution and the political power it can wield to shape any
regulations.
B. The Scope of Religious Liberty Necessary to Empower Outsiders
Religions sometimes provide both crucial social support and a platform for
individuals who otherwise would be cast to the margins of society. Other social,
political, and economic institutions have few incentives to serve these groups.
Unfortunately, not all religions perform this function. Some faiths, like the World
Church of the Creator, openly teach hatred and, at least implicitly, seem to condone
racial violence. Others consciously engage in discriminatory practices.229 Consider,
for example, Bob Jones University v. United States.230 In Bob Jones, the Court
permitted the Internal Revenue Service to deny a charitable deduction to a religious
university because it discriminated against African-American students.23 1 The
Court conceded that the discrimination was religiously based, but found that the
state interest in eradicating discrimination outweighed the Free Exercise Clause
claims of the university.232 The Court was correct in refusing to grant Bob Jones
University a Free Exercise Clause exemption for discriminating against AfricanAmericans. Religions should not be able to hide illegal discrimination behind a
Free Exercise Clause shield for two reasons. First, unlike the use of peyote in a
religious sacrament, discriminatory conduct seriously harms others.233 Second,
granting a Free Exercise exemption for discrimination is inconsistent with the
functions that warrant creating the Free Exercise Clause claim.
C. The Scope of Religious Liberty Necessary to Provide Non-Market Values
One of the functions that religion can serve is to articulate alternative values
that may not be captured in the selfish, materialistic, market-driven world. The
2.9See e.g., Rutherford, Equality,supra note
230 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

57, at 1057 n.32 and the cases cited therein.

Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 595.
233 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hacket Publishing Co.
1978). Various current scholars have applied that theory to argue that Free Exercise Clause
claims prevail unless they cause harm to others; see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 885-6 (1994);
McConnell, Smith, supra note 51, at 1128; Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond:
Alternativesfor the FreeExercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 370-75; Stephen Pepper,
Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299, 333-34; Jane
Rutherford, Relational Equality & Religious Liberty (forthcoming).
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problem, of course, is that religion and the market are not entirely separate
enterprises and the values from one spill into the other. For example, one religion
might be expressly capitalist, while another might demand a vow of poverty and
communal living. It does not necessarily follow that the capitalist faith should be
excluded from Free Exercise Clause claims. Indeed, attempts to distinguish purely
market values from religious values is perilous as the litigation involving
Scientologists suggest."' It leads back to the inherent difficulties of finding an
acceptable definition of religion. Accordingly, a value-based assessment is
necessarily suspect.
D. The Scope of Religious Liberty Necessary to FosterSpiritualityand Dignity
One of the central purposes of religion is to foster spirituality and human
dignity. Those aspects of faith that are most directly concerned with spirituality and
dignity should get the greatest legal protections. Hence, private participation in
religious rituals, sacraments, and practices should generally be permitted unless
there is a serious risk of harm. According to this standard, Smith2" is particularly
problematic not only because it intruded on a Free Exercise Clause right, but
because that right was bound up with expressly spiritual practices. Pragmatically,
that means placing the burden on the government to prove why limiting a religious
practice is essential to avoid serious harm. Although that standard may force courts
to engage in the difficult task of defining the harm and weighing whether
regulations are essential, those are tasks courts routinely perform in other kinds of
cases.
When the dispute is less bound up with a particular religious practice, the
intrusion seems less severe. Thus, all the land use cases might not implicate the
same level of concern for preserving spiritual issues. For example, when Indian
Tribal religions ascribe special spiritual significance to particular natural
formations, freedom to celebrate spirituality is at the center of the dispute. Thus,
cases like Lyng236 may be wrongly decided because special issues of spirituality are
involved. When, however, the issue is how many cars may be parked in a given
space, the issue is not necessarily bound up with spirituality at all. There are two
problems with excluding these cases. First, the government may become embroiled
in deciding what is or is not spiritual for the religious group. Second, the rules on
parking may have been created as a pretext in order to persecute the affected group.
Neither problem is insurmountable.
234

This litigation culminated in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)

(holding that donations were not tax deductible). Even though the Internal Revenue Service
won the litigation, it capitulated and agreed to treat payments as tax deductible contributions.
See Douglas Frantz, Taxes and Tactics: Behind an I.R.S. Reversal-A Special Report:
Scientology 's Puzzling JourneyFrom Tax Rebel to Tax Exempt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1997,
§ I, at 1.
235 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
236 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (rejecting a free
exercise challenge to a road built through sacred land).
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In a vertical dispute between the government and a cohesive religious group, the
courts may rely on the statements the religious group makes about the central
spiritual demands of their faith. Although it may be self-serving, it is hard to
imagine a Roman Catholic diocese announcing that available parking is part of its
core spiritual practices, while it is quite likely that the diocese might claim that
sacred ground of a Catholic cemetery is crucial to its sense of spirituality. The
public nature of the claims together with the internal consistency of the faith are
likely safeguards to insincere claims.
There are other safeguards for pretextual discrimination as well. If the religion
need not prove intent, but could rely on comparative analysis of how other
organizations were treated (an effects test), it might enable religions to protect
themselves from discriminatory rules, while allowing government some leeway in
its land use regulations. Thus, if all land in the area has to preserve twenty percent
of its surface in unpaved land for adequate drainage, then there is no reason to
permit higher density pavement on congregation property. If, however, only a
particular congregation or churches in general are limited, then the government
regulation looks less legitimate. Some of the conflicts between religion and the
state may be mediated by focusing on the function of preserving spirituality.
Another limit of the free exercise right to engage in religious practices is set by
the Establishment Clause that preserves the dignity and spirituality of others. The
Establishment Clause prevents any religious sect or group of sects from controlling
the political and cultural agenda. Accordingly, the right to engage in religious
practices is a private right that cannot be imposed on other unwilling participants
either by co-opting public space or by using public funds. Thus, under my theory,
public religious displays like nativity scenes would be unconstitutional,237 as would
prayer in school settings,238 and subsidies to religion in the form of vouchers,239 or
tax breaks.24 ° Once again, the Establishment Clause is the price religious
See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (holding that the display of a creche at a county courthouse violated the
Establishment Clause). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the
display of a creche when combined with candy canes and other seasonal items was
constitutional).
238 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting a public high school from
having a rabbi say a prayer at graduation); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding
that a moment of silence for meditation or prayer was unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that a non-denominational prayer in public school violated the
Establishment Clause).
239 See, e.g., Strout v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Educ., 13 F.Supp. 2d (D. Me. 1998)
(holding constitutional a statute that excluded sectarian schools from receipt of state funds);
Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999) (holding constitutional a statute
that excluded religious schools from receipt of state funds). But see Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (upholding a school voucher program that can be used at sectarian
and nonsectarian schools).
240 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(holding that tax deductions for contributions to religious institutions were neutral because
they did not discriminate among religions).
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individuals pay for their free exercise exemptions.
A more functional approach to the religion clauses values faith. It
acknowledges that both individuals and the society at large benefit from the
presence of many diverse religions. Because faith provides important social and
spiritual supports, unnecessary intrusions on free exercise are not trivial. Similarly,
violations of the Establishment Clause are not trivial.
CONCLUSION

Currently, the Court has seriously eroded both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. Smith"' and Boerne.4 diminished the Free Exercise Clause
so that nearly any regulation of religious practice is permissible unless it purposely
discriminates against a particular sect. Similarly, Rosenberger243 and Agostini2. 4
diminished the Establishment Clause so that it only protects against prayer in
school. One explanation for virtually reading the religion clauses out of the
Constitution is that the Court is no longer satisfied that it can distinguish a religion
from any other philosophy. Whether this fear is construed as an incipient attack of
post-modernism or a more doctrinal failure of definitions, it has serious
consequences for religious liberty. A functionalist approach to the religion clauses
helps solve the problem. It does not matter whether a practice is called a religion
or a philosophy, or whether it is perceived to be rational or irrational. If the practice
serves the functions religion serves (helping to balance power, speaking for the
marginalized, articulating non-market values, and supporting personal spirituality
and dignity), then the practice should be entitled to free exercise exemptions and be
subject to Establishment Clause limits. If Establishment Clause limits on subsidies,
tax breaks, and other forms of government support are enforced, they may limit the
risk of insincere free exercise claims. When those claiming religious exemptions
pay their own way, there is less temptation to intrude on their choices. Accordingly,
it would be appropriate to shift the burden to the government to demonstrate why
any government regulation of religious practice is essential to avoid a serious harm.
Similarly, those who accept government subsidies, tax breaks, or supports, would
then have agreed to greater government regulation of their practices. A return to
serious attempts to enforce both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause will not make these cases easier to decide, but it will give a principled basis
for preserving important liberties.

z4 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
142 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
243 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
'44 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).

